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Abstract 
 
Chile’s 1981 reform revolutionized pension design and created a system that was lauded 
and emulated widely. The main feature of the system was the creation of state-mandated, 
privately managed individual pension capitalization accounts based on contributions of 
employees. After nearly three decades of experience, there is a reassessment of the extent 
to which the pension system has achieved its objectives, particularly with respect to 
coverage and adequacy. In March 2006, the newly elected President Bachelet set up a 
Presidential Advisory Council on Pension Reform under the chairmanship of Mario 
Marcel to evaluate the existing pension system. This paper examines the rationale and the 
nature of the recommendations made by the Council. The analysis focuses on the 
structure of the proposed new pension system and risk-sharing implications of different 
pillars of the system, the accessibility of the existing pension system in terms of coverage, 
particularly for women and self-employed persons, the impact of reform on   transaction 
costs; investment policies and management and their implications for rates of return and 
financial market development. The implications of the new system on pension design and 
policy debate in Asian countries are addressed. The paper suggests that must imbibe 
lessons from countries such as Chile and urgently undertake the task of constructing 
sustainable, robust and adequate pension systems and social safety nets.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The main objectives of a pension system are to prevent a steep decline in earnings after 
retirement by facilitating consumption smoothing over the lifetime of an individual- the 
consumption smoothing objective; to ensure that individuals have adequate means to 
satisfy their accustomed needs in retirement- the income adequacy objective; and to 
ensure that consumption in old age does not fall below a minimum level- the poverty 
prevention objective
1. A pension system should therefore provide adequate insurance 
against longevity and inflation risks
2, and incorporate survivors’ benefits to avoid gender 
bias.   
 
However, these objectives have to be weighed against economic growth, market 
efficiency and flexibility, and other priorities such as health, education, and infrastructure 
that may have legitimate claims on public resources.  
 
A social security system, including a pension or provident fund, must perform five core 
functions in a professional and effective manner
3. These are: reliable collection of 
contributions, taxes and other receipts, including any loan payments (in many provident 
and pension fund schemes, a member is permitted to borrow for housing, education or 
other purposes: but the loan needs to be repaid); payment of benefits for each of the 
schemes in a timely and correct way; securing financial management and productive 
investment of provident and pension fund assets; maintaining an effective communication 
network, including development of accurate data and record keeping mechanisms to 
support collection, payment and financial activities; and production of financial 
statements and reports that are tied to providing effective and reliable governance, 
fiduciary responsibility, transparency, and accountability.   
 
Although no single idea or system can be considered appropriate for all countries, the 
World Bank’s multi pillar (or tier) pension framework, though theoretically not perfect, 
may be useful in understanding different sources (or pillars) for retirement financing from   8
the perspectives of a nation and of households; and the risks involved in each pillar
4 (see 
Figure 1).  Using a multi-tiered taxonomy, Chile has provided a three-tier social security 
system as part of a sweeping reform of the system that was undertaken in 1981. The 
reform of the Chilean pension system, which was initiated under General Pinochet’s 
military regime, has probably been one of the most widely discussed reform programs in 
a non-Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) country, and 
the most widely emulated in Latin America.  
 
The pension system in Chile has two first pillar components: (1) the minimum pension 
guarantee (MPG) and (2) a means-tested social assistance pension designed to prevent 
old age poverty. Government mandated defined contribution individual retirement 
accounts form a second pillar to facilitate consumption smoothing; and a voluntary 
additional savings account forms a third pillar. 
 
Chile’s 1981 pension reforms have been extensively discussed in social security literature 
and have had considerable influence in policy debates. The reforms resulted in a switch 
from a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) system to a privately managed contribution system, in 
which contributions were made only by employees. After nearly three decades of 
experience with the pension system, there is a reassessment of the extent to which it has 
achieved its objectives, particularly with respect to coverage and adequacy.  
 
This was reflected in the decision of the newly elected President Bachelet to set up a 
Presidential Advisory Council on Pension Reform in March 2006 under the chairmanship 
of Mario Marcel. The Council was charged with the task of evaluating the existing 
pension system. The report of the Council (also referred to as the Marcel Commission), 
which was submitted in June 2006, drew extensively from the views of economists, 
industry and trade union organizations, businesses and pension experts.  
 
The Marcel Commission report indicated that although there was no systemic crisis, the 
pension system in its existing form would not be able to meet the retirement needs of the 
people adequately or efficiently. The Commission recommended potentially far-reaching   9
changes in the overall philosophy, governance, design and investment policies of pension 
funds in Chile. Most of the Commission’s recommendations were accepted by the 
government, and were constituted into a Pension Reform Bill. 
 
In January 2008, the Congress approved the Pension Reform Bill, thereby completing the 
last step of the legislative process. In March 2008, President Bachelet signed the 
legislation establishing the new pension scheme.  Benefits under the new scheme are 
scheduled to commence from July 1, 2008. 
 
The pension reform initiative is the most important change to the existing pension system 
since its creation in 1981. The main objective of this study is to analyze the Marcel 
Commission report and its implications for pension reform in developing Asia
5.  The rest 
of the paper is organized as follows. An overview of the Chilean economy in Section 2 
sets the context for analyzing pension reform. This is followed by an assessment of the 
existing pension system. Section 4 describes the main recommendations of the Marcel 
Commission Report. Finally, Section 5 highlights possible lessons for Asian countries 
from the Chilean pension reforms. 
    10
2.  An Overview of the Chilean Economy 
 
Chile has a market-oriented economy with a fairly large external sector. The pension 
reform process in Chile was initiated by a military regime in 1980, and deepened by 
various democratic governments that have held power since 1990. Chile has acquired a 
sound reputation for strong financial institutions and political stability that have given it 
one of the highest sovereign ratings in South America
6.   
 
Tables 1 and 2 provide selected macroeconomic and demographic characteristics of the 
Chilean economy respectively. The following observations may be made on the basis of 
data in these tables.  
 
•  In 2007, Chile’s GDP was USD162 billion, and its population was nearly 17 
million. Its per capita income was therefore US$9948.5 in 2007.  
•  Almost 88 percent of Chile’s population lives in urban areas. 
•  Indicators of longevity and mortality reveal relatively high human development: 
Chile was ranked 40 out of 177 countries in the 2007/08 Human Development 
Index published by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)  
•  During the period 2005-07, real GDP grew at an average rate of about 4.9 percent, 
and consumer price inflation remained at an average rate of 4.7 percent.  
 
The Central Bank of Chile, in its May 2008 monetary report, has projected real GDP 
growth of 4 to 5 percent in 2008 in view of recessionary trends in many countries of the 
world. Further, owing to higher oil prices and rising food prices, consumer price inflation 
is expected to reach an average of 6.9 percent in 2008, though inflation is expected to 
decline below 5 percent by December 2008.  
 
Table 3 presents data on selected income distribution and poverty indicators of Chile for 
the period 1980-2000. Data suggest that since the 1990s, per capita income has more than 
trebled in US dollar terms, and there has been a significant reduction in poverty. Between 
2003 and 2006, the poverty rate fell from over 18 percent to about 14 percent. However,   11
income inequality within Chilean society remains high: the richest 10 percent of 
households receive 45 percent of income; while the poorest 20 percent receive only about 
3.8 percent of income. A key challenge for the government is to mitigate the extreme 
poverty that pervades some pockets, while continuing to improve overall standards of 
living. 
 
Chile is the world’s leading producer and exporter of copper. Estimates of the Central 
Bank of Chile indicate that copper exports contributed over 58 percent of total exports in 
2007; followed by food, beverages, liquor and tobacco at 11.2 percent;  basic metals and 
chemicals and machine and equipment at 9.3 percent; and forestry, furniture, paper, pulp, 
and publishing at 7.2 percent.  It is expected that a rise in industrial exports in the future 
will increase the volume of non-copper exports relative to copper exports. In the past, 
Chile’s economic fortunes were closely linked to the price of copper – which is the 
country’s most important commodity export and its highest export-revenue generator. In 
order to hedge the exchange rate from copper-price volatility, the government, in recent 
years, has shifted a substantial part of copper revenues into dollar-denominated assets. As 
a result, despite record-high copper prices in 2005-06, peso appreciation has been 
manageable, and the real exchange rate has been fairly stable. 
 
Chile’s macroeconomic policy framework is based on the principles of a floating 
exchange rate, inflation targeting, and a mandated commitment to maintaining a fiscal 
surplus. In 2000, Chile adopted the fiscal surplus rule that requires the government to 
control the structural surplus
7.  This rule shields the economy from the repercussions of 
volatility in the price of copper, and allows it to use copper revenues in a prudent manner.  
 
The extremely high copper prices in 2005 and 2006 left Chile with surpluses that 
substantially eased its fiscal position. The budget surpluses have allowed the Chilean 
government to make debt prepayments, and led to a significant increase in its assets from 
the copper revenues. Thus the government has become a net creditor, if recognition bond 
liabilities are excluded
8. Chile’s healthy fiscal position is likely to reduce external 
borrowing requirements, as well as provide considerable spending flexibility in the   12
medium term. In particular, Chile has been able to maintain its competitiveness and 
generate fiscal flexibility for social expenditure. Table 4 highlights selected fiscal 
indicators. 
 
The level of the structural budget surplus to be targeted by the government from 2008 
was reduced from 1 percent to 0.5 percent of GDP in May 2007. Estimates by the IMF 
indicate that the change increased available government resources by approximately USD 
740 million on a permanent basis. A major proportion of the additional funds released 
have been earmarked for the education sector; and some portion for pension expenditure. 
The government has adopted several measures to improve effectiveness of public 
expenditure such as setting up of new agencies supervising public investment and 
education, and the introduction of a new fiscal transparency law. 
 
In terms of economic and financial development, business environment, technological 
progress, and quality of life, Chile is often the highest ranked economy in Latin America. 
The IMD World Competitiveness Index Yearbook 2008, as well as the World Economic 
Forum, ranked Chile at 26
th position in their indices; and Chile was ranked among the top 
ten countries of the world on indicators measuring monetary policies, fiscal policies, tax 
compliance and opening up of the economy.  
 
The overall quality of governance and strength of institutional systems suggests that 
Chile is capable of achieving its target of raising long-term growth sufficiently to match 
the income levels of industrialized countries.  In order to further develop Chile’s 
strengths and reduce its vulnerabilities, the government has embarked on a structural 
reform program that encompasses sectors as diverse as education, pensions and the 
financial sector. Initiatives to improve education and innovation, and increase skill sets of 
Chile’s labor force will be critical for enhancing human capital and raising future growth 
prospects. Financial market reforms aim to develop domestic capital markets, strengthen 
corporate governance and facilitate foreign investment, while improving the integration 
of Chilean financial markets with global markets. 
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The proposed pension reform is likely to be among the most significant components of 
the overall reform agenda. The new pension plan will retain the basic features of the 
present system, but will introduce features to increase pension coverage and equity. The 
government estimates that the overall cost of reform will not exceed one percent of GDP, 
an amount that Chile can afford in view of its strong fiscal position and stable macro-
economic outlook.  
 
Pension reform is expected to have a wide-ranging impact on the economy. While its 
chief goal is to create a social safety net for the poorest elderly, and thus reduce poverty 
and income inequality; the reform is also expected to further develop financial and capital 
markets.  For instance, the proposed widening of investment options for pension fund 
administrators and increase in their foreign investment limits may spur competition in 
local markets, enhance asset quality held by members of pension funds and further 
integrate domestic markets with overseas markets.  
   14
3. An Assessment of the Chilean Pension System 
 
 
Chile has always been a pioneer in setting up and reforming pension systems. In 1924, it 
was the first country in Latin America to set up a National Insurance System with the aim 
of providing insurance against old age, disability and death. The system became more 
complex in the following decades. By the late 1970s, Chile had a pension system 
organized on a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) basis. However, the system was financially 
unsustainable, politicized and highly fragmented. In 1979, there were about 35 schemes 
or “cajas” within the system with vastly different conditions of participation and 
entitlement. The system was subject to rampant abuse by political groups because 
benefits were decided through lobbying and political power, but paid out of a common 
pool. Thus early retirement became a popular election “promise”; with some cajas, such 
as those covering bank employees, allowing generously funded retirement after just 25 
years of service
9.  
Demographic changes and greater unemployment had increased the fiscal burden of the 
system. For example, the ratio of contributing employees to retirees had declined from 
12:1 in 1955 to 2.5:1 in 1979
10.  The viability of the system was also undermined by 
widespread social security evasion, as both workers and employers connived to 
contribute at the legal minimum rate for all except the last few years of the worker’s 
active life, when the contributions were counted for pension purposes. This situation 
forced the State to raise contributions, which led to even greater evasion. The State’s 
fiscal position worsened steadily under the burden of insufficiently-funded pension 
benefits, and by 1980, the PAYGO system had a fiscal deficit of 2.7 percent of GDP.  
 
While the economic unviability of the public social security system was manifest, the 
political will to reform was not summoned until the military dictatorship of General 
Pinochet. In 1980, the public system was closed and replaced by a new private system 
that started functioning in May 1981.  
   15
All workers joining the  force after January 1, 1983 were required to join the new system. 
Members of the old cajas-based system were given a choice: the existing cajas were 
merged into a single organization – Institute of Social Security Normalisation (Instituto 
de Normalización Previsional or INP), and workers had the option to remain with the INP. 
However, there were strong incentives for many workers to move to the new system. 
Accumulated contributions in the old system were protected by converting them into non-
tradable Government-issued “recognition bonds” (bonos de reconocimiento) that would 
be made available to the worker on retirement. Many workers switched to the new system 
because it gave them an immediate increase in post-tax earnings
11. The actual reasons 
may be debatable, but there was a widespread movement from the INP to the AFP (the 
new Pension Fund Administrators) based pension system. In 1987, only about 21 percent 
of those who contributed to either the old or the new pension system were members of 
the old system, but by 1990, that figure had declined to less than 16 percent (CBO, 1999). 
 
In 1981, even in the most advanced countries, social security was provided through partly 
or fully-public pension systems. Thus Chile’s move to a fully privatized pension system 
revolutionized pension design and created a system that continues to be lauded and 
emulated. It should be stressed that Chile’s 1981 reform long preceded its enthusiastic 
advocacy by the World Bank’s 1994 report “Averting the Old Age Crisis”. Thus, Chile’s 
success cannot be traced to advice from the World Bank. A sociological discussion of the 




3.1  Features of the Pension System 
 
There are four key characteristics of the system: Defined Contribution (DC), non-defined 
benefits, individual pension accounts and private management of funds.  The salient 
features of the system are outlined below: 
 
(1) Individual  Capitalization   16
Each worker has an individual pension account which commences at the start of his 
working life and accumulates his contributions till retirement. The retirement age is 65 
years for men and 60 years for women; early retirement and withdrawal of pension is 
permitted only under certain conditions. Members of the pension system, also known as 
affiliates, have to mandatorily contribute 10 percent of their taxable earnings into this 
account every month
13. Contributions made towards the pension account are tax free. 
Employers do not contribute towards employee pensions, thus creating an entirely self-
financed contribution system. An additional 2-3 percent of salary is paid to cover 
administrative costs and premium payments for disability and survivors insurance
14.  All 
variables in the system (contributions and benefits) are measured in Unidades de 
Fomento (UFs) which is a monetary unit that automatically adjusts for inflation, thus 
ensuring that all flows are evaluated in real terms
15.  
 
Members can voluntarily contribute an additional portion of their salary into their 
individual capitalization account. These contributions serve to enhance members’ 
pensions by providing an additional avenue for savings, and also enable members to plan 
for early retirement. The extra contribution is tax-deductible, as long as it does not exceed 
50 UF per month. These payments have the same tax advantages as the basic contribution 
and are not taken into account when deciding entitlement to the minimum pension. 
 
Since August 1987, members have been permitted to save in a separate Voluntary 
Savings Account, also known as Account Two or the Ahorro Voluntary Previsional 
(APV) account. This account is independent of the individual capitalization account. 
Deposits can be made regularly or infrequently into the APV account, though 
withdrawals are limited to four times per year.  
 
From 1st March 2002, Law Nº 19,768 came into force, which reformed the system for 
voluntary social security savings by extending the number of institutions allowed to 
handle it, and providing greater liquidity and higher tax benefits to savings in voluntary 
social security accounts. Members were permitted to opt for APV “deposits”, or for 
deposits made in the savings plans offered by banks, life insurance companies and   17




The most important aspect of the 2002 law was that self-employed workers were given 
access to the benefits of voluntary savings accounts. From March 1, 2002, the tax 
incentives provided to Account Two holders were extended to self-employed persons
17 
and members of the INP, in order to provide coverage to a larger proportion of workers, 
thus creating a voluntary pillar for most of the Chilean workforce. Liquidity of these 
accounts was improved by permitting advance non-pension withdrawals, though 
withdrawals made before retirement are considered as income in the year in which they 
take place and are subject to a special tax (except in the special case when a member 
transfers his voluntary account balance to his individual capitalization account). 
 
Funds accumulated in the voluntary savings account are not considered in deciding the 
right to the state guarantee for minimum pension.  AFPs were permitted to charge an 
annual percentage of the accumulated funds for managing Agreed Deposits and 
Voluntary Social Security Contributions as commission. This commission has fluctuated 
between 0.47 percent and 0.70 percent of accumulated funds in recent years.  
 
Workers may have an agreement with their employers to deposit certain amounts into 
their individual capitalization account, either as a one-time fixed payment, a monthly 
percentage of income or a fixed monthly amount. Such deposits are independent of the 
mandatory and voluntary contributions, and are called agreed deposits. However, they are 
paid into the individual capitalization account and form part of the sub-total of voluntary 
contributions. Funds in the agreed deposit category are not considered as income for the 
worker, so that they are not taxable and are not considered in deciding entitlement to the 
state minimum pension. However, they are not freely available and can be withdrawn 
only at retirement.  
 
As of December 2005, there were 1,478,029 voluntary savings accounts, with an average 
balance of 271,399 pesos
18 each. To put this number into perspective, it may be   18
compared with the 3,784,141 contributors to the system in that period, suggesting that the 
number of APV accounts was close to 40 percent of the number of contributors.  
 
(2)  Private management of funds 
Funds flowing into the pension account are managed by one of several privately owned, 
public limited companies called Administradoras de Fondo de Pensiones (AFPs). AFPs 
are exclusively involved in management of pension funds: they collect contributions, 
invest them professionally and efficiently in accordance with prescribed regulations of 
maximizing returns, and administer and distribute benefits to affiliates. They also take out 
disability and survivors’ insurance policies. AFPs receive a commission, usually paid 
directly as a percentage of affiliates’ salary. These commissions currently vary between 
1-2 percent of members’ taxable earnings, and are paid out monthly. 
 
An employee can choose and switch between AFPs, but frequent switching involves high 
costs
19. Currently, there are six AFPs, of which the top three control over 70 percent of 
the market (Table 5). 
AFPs are permitted to invest in both domestic and international markets, though stringent 
investment regulations continue to be in place. A multifondos or “multifunds” system was 
introduced in 2002 to provide greater diversification and profit-opportunities to affiliates. 
AFPs were required to offer five portfolio options with different risk-return 
combinations; the funds being differentiated by the percentage of equities and fixed-
income securities that they may invest in. This reform recognizes that “members differ in 
age, in accumulation of savings, in aversion or predisposition to risk and in their horizon 
of time left for contributing and that they are therefore in positions to accept different 
degrees of risk when investing their savings”
20.  
Table 6 shows the break-up of fund accumulations by fund type. It suggests that the 
majority of contributors prefer funds B and C, which are categorized as medium risk. 
Fund E (no equity investment) has the least participation, probably because it is the least 
risky and expected to generate the lowest returns. Fund C, with permitted equity 
investment in the range 15-40 percent appears to be the most popular across AFPs.   19
 (3)  Benefits 
On retirement, the accumulated funds in an individual’s account can be paid out in one of 
the following ways: 
•  Annuity –  Members can use their individual account balances to purchase a life 
annuity from an insurance company. These annuities are inflation indexed (i.e 
denominated in UF) and provide survivorship benefits. 
•  Temporary income with deferred annuity – A portion of member funds can be 
transferred to an insurance company to purchase a deferred annuity, which 
provides a monthly income from a future date as stipulated in the purchase 
agreement. The remaining funds in the individual’s account may be retained with 
the AFP in return for a monthly income until the period of commencement of the 
annuity income.   
•  Programmed withdrawal – Member can withdraw their savings over a period of 
time according to an actuarially determined schedule set by the Government. 
•   Programmed withdrawal with annuity - On retirement, a portion of member 
funds may be retained with the AFP for a period of time, during which a 
programmed pension would be paid out to the member. Simultaneously, the 
remaining accumulated funds would be transferred to an annuity provider, who 
would provide a life-time inflation indexed annuity.  Thus the pensioner can 
obtain two kinds of pension benefits at the same time. 
 
Early retirement is permitted if the account balance of a member allows him a pension 
equivalent to at least 70 percent of his average income for the past ten years and 150 
percent of the minimum pension. This rule was imposed in August 2007 with a view to 
discourage early retirement and withdrawal from the system. 
 
Unlike the old PAYGO system, benefits received under this system are uncertain or non-
defined, and depend on factors such as the amount, frequency and continuity of 
contributions made into individual accounts, the returns earned on these contributions and 
the life-expectancy of the pensioner. The “recognition bonds” issued to members who 
switched from the old PAYGO system are also inflation indexed and earn an interest of 4   20
percent per annum, but are available only on retirement, disability or death
21 (Arenas de 
Mesa and Mesa-Lago, 2006). 
 
(4)  Regulation 
The Superintendency of Pension Fund Administrators (SAFP) is the regulatory authority 
responsible for the oversight and control of the AFPs. The functions of the SAFP cover 
financial, actuarial, legal and administrative areas and its relationship with the 
Government is through the Ministry of Work and Social Security.  The Superintendent of 
AFPs, appointed by the President of the Republic, is the Head of the Institution.





The AFPs and Insurance Companies paid pensions worth US$2.2 billion per year to 622 
thousand people, while the INP paid US$1.55 billion to 813 thousand pensioners in the 
civilian
24 sector in August 2007. As Table 7 shows, two-thirds of these pensions were 
paid to retirees, though most were for early retirement. While there are about 7.9 million 
members in the AFP system, only about 4.3 million workers (54 percent) contribute 
regularly (mostly salaried employees). Those not contributing include the currently 
unemployed, unpaid family workers and employers, and the self-employed.  In December 
2007, the system had accumulated about US$111.03 billion (equivalent to 2.8 billion UF). 
AFPs have earned an average annual accumulated real yield of 10 percent over the period 
July 1981 to December 2007; so if a person started contributing in May 1981 and was 
still active today, three-quarters of his/her savings would come from yield. Table 8 shows 
basic trends in the AFP system since inception. 
 
Pension reform has been credited with being a key reason for Chile’s high economic 
growth
25. However, the growth of pension funds was supported by improved policies in 
other areas and institutions: during 1981-2002, Chile implemented product market 
liberalization, and macro-economic stabilization and financial reforms, which pushed the 
average annual GDP growth to 4.6 percent in this period. Thus pension funds were put to 
good use by the government and regulatory authorities (Corbo, 2004).   21
 
When AFPs started accumulating contributions from workers in 1981, Chile had no 
capital markets worth mentioning, and all funds were invested in the banking sector or 
government securities. Gradually, as investment norms were liberalized and the capital 
markets developed (partly as a consequence of the availability of pension funds) the 
investment portfolio of AFPs diversified to include several instruments and markets. As 
of December 2007, only 7.8 percent of the AFP portfolio was invested in securities issued 
by the Government; 30.4 percent was invested in local banks; 35.6 percent abroad and 
26.2 percent in shares and bonds of local companies. 
 
Pension funds have made a significant contribution to Chile’s economic development by 
harnessing savings and simultaneously enabling the growth of financial markets for 
efficient deployment of savings.  Pension fund savings have become an important source 
of financing for the Government, for banks and for companies. Almost 100 percent of the 
financing of mortgage-backed securities for housing and bank bonds belongs to the 
pension funds; as does 45 percent of corporate bonds and 55 percent of government 
securities. Pension funds have contributed to financing Chile’s main road and transport 
infrastructure projects and have invested in different sectors of the economy (Table 9). 
 
A study by Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) concluded that reform had resulted in 
significant financial deepening. They estimated that 31 to 46 percent of the increase in 
the ratio of financial assets to GDP (financial deepening) in 1981-2001 could be 
attributed to the reforms. Further, controlling for structural reform and other factors, 20 
percent of the increase in Total Factor Productivity during that period was due to 
financial deepening. There appear to be strong links between pension reform and 
economic growth, transmitted through markets, stronger financial systems and larger 
savings and investment pool.  
 
The Chilean reforms have been lauded as a far-sighted initiative that attempted to correct 
the consequences of running an unfunded social security system with rapidly growing 
obligations. The pension reforms made an important contribution to restoring equity in   22
social security burdens and benefits, improving fiscal discipline, increasing the growth of 
equity and bond markets and savings formation, and contributing significantly to the 
remarkable economic performance of the Chilean economy since the early eighties
26.  
 
3.3     State Guarantees 
 
The basic tenet of Chile’s system is that each worker is responsible for financing his own 
pensions. However the State does provide some assistance for those unable to fund their 
retirements. This is achieved in two ways:  
(i)  PASIS: A publicly funded means-tested social assistance pension is provided 
to the poorest aged members, irrespective of their contribution history. The 
Government limits the number of PASIS pensions granted in order to control 
expenditure; thus there is always a waiting list to access these pensions.  
(ii)  MPG: A Minimum Pension Guarantee is provided to all individuals who have 
contributed to the system for at least 20 years (specifically, made at least 240 
contributions) but have not accumulated enough to achieve a minimum 
pension. This guarantee applies only when a member does not have enough 
accumulations to enable him to draw down a pre-specified minimum benefit: 
the State simply tops up the members’ accounts by an adequate amount. The 
minimum pension is set at approximately three-fourths of Chile’s minimum 
wage or one-fourth of the average wage. Presently it is about US$180 per 
month. 
There are other covert guarantees provided by the State. If an AFP goes bankrupt, the 
Pension Funds belonging to the members do not suffer, instead the worker simply 
transfers them to another AFP. 
In the case of the bankruptcy of an Insurance Company, the State guarantees 100 percent 
of the minimum pension guaranteed by the State, plus 75 percent of the difference 
between the pension the pensioner was receiving and the Minimum Pension Guaranteed 
by the State, with a ceiling of 45 UF per month.   23
3.4    Fiscal Impact  
 
Although the Chilean pension reform of 1981 transferred the responsibility of generating 
pensions to the workers, the State continued to bear the costs of regulation, providing 
safety nets and paying the transitions costs of moving from the old PAYGO system. The 
fiscal costs to the government include the following: 
(i)  Pension payments to all retirees who opted to stay under the old system 
(ii)  Financing of recognition bonds to retirees who switched to the new system  
(iii)  Guaranteed minimum pensions  
(iv)  PASIS payments      
(v)  Deficits of the public pensions of the armed forces and the police 
 
The outflows under (i) and (ii) represent transition costs of moving from the PAYGO to 
the DC system and are temporary in nature. Outflows under (iii) to (v) are permanent 
under the DC system and will need to be paid out unless there is significant structural 
reform that alters its parameters completely. Arenas De Mesa and Mesa-Lago (2006) 
measure the fiscal costs as a percentage of GDP for each of the categories (i) to (v) over 
the period 1981-2004 (Table 10). The composition of transition costs has changed in the 
last two decades: as fewer people claim benefits under the old system and more retirees 
cash-in their recognition bonds, outflows under (i) have declined, while those under (ii) 
have increased. The deficit of the civilian system accounted for about three-fourths of the 
total deficit of the pension system.    
 
 
Total transition costs, as measured by the sum of (i) and (ii), peaked at 5.7 percent of 
GDP in the 1980s and declined to 3.8 percent in the 1990s. They are projected to be 
about 3.2 percent of GDP in the medium term. The transition costs in Chile were 
relatively higher than those of other Latin American countries that undertook similar 
reform partly because the government opted to recognize accrued obligations under the 
old system on generous terms. The transition period in Chile is expected to last until 2037, 
when only the AFP system will be functional. At that point in time, it is estimated that the   24




In addition, Chile also has to meet ongoing fiscal costs on account of the minimum 
pension guarantee, which requires a government top-up of individual pension accounts. 
Currently, more than 11 percent of retirees receive a minimum pension guarantee benefit, 
which costs 0.1 percent of GDP. Soto (2005) estimated that as the system matures, more 
than 30 percent of participants will seek recourse to the minimum pension guarantee, 
resulting in a fiscal burden of about 1 percent of GDP.  Estimated costs of the non-
contributory pension assistance program (PASIS) are projected to be about 0.5 percent of 
GDP.  
 
Chile managed its 1981 transition using a pre-reform budget surplus, and by cultivating 
post-reform fiscal discipline generated through a combination of tax increases, cost 
cutting and asset sales. The government had a fiscal surplus of 5.5 percent of GDP before 
the pension reform in 1980, creating a cushion that absorbed the costs of transition to 
some extent. In 1981, an income tax of 3 percent was introduced, but it was phased out 
(by decreasing it annually by one percentage point) by 1984. The share of government 
expenditure in GDP shrunk from 32 percent in1974-84, to 25 percent in 1985-99. The 
Chilean government also undertook massive privatization in 1985-89; selling off 
government assets worth 7 percent of GDP (Niemietz, 2007).  
 
The purpose of fiscal tightening was to absorb transition costs and consequently, the 
public dis-saving that might have resulted in the absence of tightening was reduced. In 
fact, most of the increase in national savings in the post-reform period was a result of 
public saving and private corporate savings (which rose after 1984 as a result of structural 
tax reform). The costs of Chile’s pension system are high, and will continue to be 
incurred by the government for some years. Chile’s ability to sustain the system on the 
basis of fiscal discipline has been widely commended.   25
3.5  Outcomes of the Chilean Pension System 
 
The Chilean model of pensions was widely expected to meet the basic objective of a 
pension system, providing universal (or near-universal) and adequate income in old age 
to enable retirees to live with dignity. By providing a clear link between worker 
contributions and post-retirement benefits, it was expected to impart workers with a sense 
of ownership of, and responsibility for, retirement savings. The extent to which these 
objectives have been met can be assessed by examining the following outcomes, which 
flow directly from the pension design: extent of coverage, contribution density, gender 
equality and replacement rate
28. In addition, an accurate assessment of the effectiveness 
of the system can be made only by studying the market structure of AFPs. In this 
category, the relevant outcomes are – level of administrative costs, competition among 
AFPs and the regulation of investment by pension funds. 
 
The evaluation of the Chilean pension system in this section will begin with an 
assessment of the AFP industry; and will be followed by an examination of other 
outcomes of pension reform. 
 
(1)  AFP Market Structure 
 Administrative Costs  
The AFPs charge two types of commissions from their members: fixed and variable. 
Fixed commissions are levied as a flat sum, irrespective of account balances. Variable 
commissions are charged as a percent of taxable income, and simply added to member 
contributions. The variable commission includes the management cost incurred by AFPs 
as well as the cost of taking out a disability and survivorship insurance. As a percent of 
average taxable income, the average cost to a contributor in December 2006 was 
disaggregated as follows: 
 
Disability and Survivorship Insurance:  1.05%  
AFP  Commission:     1.32%     
Fixed  Commission:     0.06%     26
Total  Costs:      2.37%   
 
Both fixed and variable commissions have declined over the years (Table 11). It is 
claimed by the AFPs that their management commissions have fallen by 50 percent from 
the early years to the present, while the cost of the insurance has tended to increase
29, 
resulting in only a marginal fall in total variable commissions. Despite the declining trend 
in fixed commissions (from a high of  885 pesos in 1988 to 410 pesos in 2005), it has 
been criticized for its regressive nature because the account balances and future pensions 
of lower income contributors are eroded to a greater extent relative to higher income 
contributors. The greatest negative impact of fixed commissions is on irregular 
contributors with small balances.  
 
On retirement, members pay additional costs in the form of withdrawal commissions or 
annuity purchase fees, depending on their chosen payout option.  
 
The high administrative costs of AFPs can be partly attributed to marketing and 
advertising expenses, and the costs of maintaining a large sales force in order to attract 
and retain members.  In October 1997, the government tightened the rules for transferring 
between AFPs. The impact was immediate and significant. In 1997, the number of 
members who had notified for a transfer was at 2,125,158, and fell to 779,363 the 
following year as new regulations were put in place to limit inter-AFP transfers, and was 
at 245,787 in December 2005. The number of sales agents fell correspondingly: from 
17448 in 1997 to 6343 in 1998, and to 2348 in December 2005
30. As a result, the 
combined expenditure on salesmen and publicity, which formed 39.7 percent of 
operational expenditure of AFPs in 1997, had declined to 25.4 percent of operational 
expenditure by 2004
31.   
 
A comparison of costs in Chile with other Latin American countries reveals that Chile 
probably has one of the least cost pension systems. Mesa-Lago (2005) reports that if 
managerial costs are computed as commissions plus premium paid for disability and 
survivorship insurance, then total managerial costs as a percentage of deductions from 
workers’ wages that are deposited in individual accounts were about 18.43 percent for   27
Chile, making it the second lowest in the region (much lower than the average of 25.82 
percent). Yet it is widely accepted that commissions are still “unacceptably high for a 
large percentage of the population”, and any reduction has been achieved “at the cost of 
restricting individual choice and competition between pension fund administrators”
32.  
 
Commission charges also dilute the return earned on contributions. The total average 
return on worker contributions during 1982- July 2002 would decline from 10.5 percent 
to 6.1 percent if measured net of commission charges. This demonstrates the need to 
consider returns actually credited to members’ accounts after all expenses have been 
netted. The return earned by members who entered the system after 1982 is even lower, 
and falls below zero for those who began contributing after 1996. The average worker 




Soto (2005) calculated the impact of commissions and administrative fees for a 
hypothetical average worker who enters the system in 1982 and retires in 2005. Even 
under very generous assumptions, he found that more than a fifth of the accumulated 
funds were accounted for by administrative fees and commissions
34. In addition, at 
retirement, workers would need to pay withdrawal commissions or annuity purchase fees, 
which would further erode their accumulated balances. 
 
Competition 
AFPs do not compete with each other on price, yield or services offered; thus there is 
effectively no competition in the market for pension funds.  When the pension system 
was launched, it was expected that market forces would operate through privately 
managed AFPs to generate competitive prices, efficient services and product 
differentiation. However, partly as a result of the restrictive regulations imposed by the 
government, and partly as a consequence of system design, the AFP market has evolved 
into a concentrated and non-competitive system. 
   28
The system started with 12 AFPs. Their number grew rapidly when trade unions were 
permitted to set up AFPs, resulting in 21 AFPs by 1994. Subsequently a wave of mergers 
and consolidations reduced the system to 6 AFPs. Over 70 percent of contributors are 
affiliated to one of the top three AFPs, and no new administrators have entered the 
market for several years despite the profitable nature of the industry. Clearly, there are 
steep barriers to entry. Some of the hurdles are regulatory in nature: for instance, the 
requirement of a single corporate purpose, the creation of obligatory reserves, and the 
mandatory minimum return that is required to be earned on investment.   
 
 
But tight government regulation of fees and commissions has also created operational 
challenges unique to the Chilean system. AFPs are obliged to charge identical 
commissions from all members, levied as a proportion of wages. As a result, they are not 
permitted to offer differentiated (higher-priced and better quality) services to their higher-
income (and therefore high-margin) members. Further, the mandatory nature of the 
pension product creates member apathy: most members are found to be uninterested in 
comparing prices and yields of competing fund administrators; many are even unaware of 
such differences. Pro-active members that search for low-cost, high-quality 
administrators are an important catalyst to competition, and one that is missing in Chile. 
As a result, the only way AFPs could attract and retain high-income members was 
through aggressive marketing and the deployment of a large sales force. Since they are 
not permitted to charge varying fees, AFPs have resorted to sales strategies such as gifts 
and discounts to attract customers. Thus there is no incentive to cut costs and prices, and 
conditions are not conducive to a transparent process of price identification in the market.  
 
Existing banks, mutual funds, or insurance companies are not permitted to manage 
pension funds unless a separate fund management company is created for that purpose. 
Effectively, this regulation creates walls around the pension fund industry that protects 
the fund managers from competition from other financial  intermediaries and products, 
encourages larger marketing and set-up costs, and denies the affiliates investment 
vehicles better suited to their needs (Shah, 1997). 
   29
Investment Regulation 
The regulation of AFP investments is based on fairly rigid portfolio restrictions. For each 
AFP, there are investment limits for each instrument type, in absolute terms for each 
investment category, in terms of risk which can be accepted for assets and also for each 
type of authorized market in which investment is permitted. The limits for the funds put 
together, number more than 100
35.  The extent of regulation tends to reduce investment 
efficiency and flexibility, as managers are more concerned with ensuring compliance 
with prudential norms than maximizing investment efficiency
36. 
 
Pension funds in Chile have to earn a ‘minimum return’ from their portfolio. Each AFP 
must guarantee that the average real return in the last 6 months is not lower than the 
lesser of: (1) the average real return of each fund minus 2 percentage points for the funds 
C, D and E (with a higher proportion of fixed income securities) and 4 percentage points 
for the funds A and B (with a higher equity exposure) or (2) 50 percent of the average 
real return of all the funds. If an AFP exceeds the average rate by 2 percentage points (or 
4 percentage points in case of fund A and B) or by 50 percent of the average return of all 
funds, whichever is higher, then excess returns are required to be placed in a profitability 
fluctuation reserve, to be drawn only when returns fall below the required minimum 
return. An AFP must also keep 1 percent of the value of its pension funds as a separate 
cash reserve called encaje, which is used if returns fall below the mandated minimum. 
When the difference is not covered by the reserve of the funds, then the government has 
to provide compensation. Thus, the government still bears the contingent liability. It 
therefore has a stake in constructing a competent and prudential regulatory structure.  
 
The chief result of this performance regulation was that most of the AFPs had similar 
portfolios yielding similar returns because of ‘herding’ behaviour. Smaller fund managers 
are influenced by and imitate the portfolios of larger funds. The larger funds, in turn, in 
the absence of ‘rate-of-return’ competition, may not have an incentive to strive for a 
return above the government-specified ceiling. This is a moral hazard problem that 
prevents fund managers from attaining the optimal point in the   portfolio efficiency 
frontier. Mandating a single fund per administrator reinforces herding behavior and   30
homogeneity of portfolios across funds. This situation leads to another problem: if fund 
administrators are not competing to generate the highest return, they tend to compete 
through excessive marketing and advertising, the costs of which are usually passed on to 
members. This situation was observed in Chile during the 1990s, as described earlier in 
this section. An examination of the average correlation between pairs of funds in 
Argentina, Chile and Peru from their inception until May 1998 reveals that the correlation 
is extremely high: 0.98 in Chile, 0.93 in Peru and 0.87 in Argentina.  Clearly, Chilean 
fund managers were not substantially different from each other in terms of returns 
generated
37. An adverse outcome of this homogenous returns environment is that since 
contributions are mandatory for employed Chileans, they cannot, in the absence of a 
better provider, opt out of the system.  
The Government has attempted to gradually liberalize investment regulations, with a 
view to increasing yield and flexibility. Two developments in this direction have been of 
great significance: the introduction of risk-differentiated pension plans, and the gradual 
easing of portfolio restrictions.  
Since 2002, AFPs have been permitted to offer portfolios with varying risk profiles, in 
order to accommodate the different risk-return preferences of members. Currently each 
AFP offers five types of plans (A, B, C, D and E) with varying debt-equity compositions, 
such that the extent of equity exposure declines from A to E. Table 12 lists the permitted 
equity limits within the multi-funds system. Members can opt for any of the plans; except 
for men over the age of 55 and women over the age of 50 who are not pensioners, who 
are not permitted to invest in the equity-intensive fund A. Similarly, pensioners using 
programmed withdrawal can only choose between the three funds with least investment 
in equities (Funds C, D and E).  Both groups may choose any of the five funds for their 
voluntary contributions, agreed deposits and voluntary savings account. 
 
In May 2007, over 2.7 million people exercised their choice with respect to type of 
pension plan, representing about 64 percent of the contributors. In the first six months of 
2007, fund B tended to be most popular choice, with 37 percent of the total preferences, 
followed by types A and C with 36 percent and 22 percent of the total respectively.    31
Almost three-fourths of new preferences between May 2007 and May 2006 were for 
funds A and B, a choice that is possibly driven by the relatively higher returns on these 
schemes (see Table 13)
38. If a member does not expressly choose a fund, the law requires 
AFPs to gradually transfer him to an appropriate fund in accordance with his age-related 
risk tolerance. The purpose of introducing multi-fund options was to encourage active 
participation of members in the investment process, thereby increasing their awareness 
and involvement in planning for their future pension income. 
When the pension reforms were launched in 1981, fund managers invested largely in 
government backed securities or bank deposits, not just because of regulatory 
requirements but also because the Chilean capital market was not liquid or well-
developed. Gradually, restrictions on permitted instruments, markets and investment 
limits were liberalized. The purchase of shares was authorized in 1985, and foreign 
investment was permitted in 1992. The creation of the multi-fund system in 2002 further 
spurred diversification across markets and instruments.  The maximum level of asset 
allocation in foreign instruments was raised from 20 percent to 30 percent in 2004; and a 
recent bill to be enacted in Parliament suggests a range of 30 to 45 percent for the 
maximum limit of investments of pension funds in foreign markets
39. The asset-mix of 
Chilean pension funds is highly diversified and balanced, especially in comparison with 
other private systems in Latin America. The SAFP is often credited with modern 
financial practices and promoting diversification, in contrast with other countries in the 
region where pension funds have sometimes simply been used to fund state debt. As 
Table 14 shows, concentration of pension funds in public debt has reduced over the years, 
declining from a high of 47 percent in 1986 to about 16.5 percent in 2005. Investment in 
foreign assets amounts to 30 percent of funds, and 23.5 percent was used to fund the 
corporate sector.   
 
Pension funds and capital markets have developed concurrently in Chile. The availability 
of a large pool of investible pension funds created and then deepened the market for 
instruments of varying risk tenor and durations. The housing mortgage market and 
infrastructure development projects have also benefited from pension fund financing. As   32
AFPs were required to insure affiliates for disability and death, insurance markets grew 
and evolved. A host of complementary financial services, including credit rating and risk 
evaluation services, have developed as a direct consequence of capital market 




Coverage is one of the main indicators of the effectiveness of a pension system; a system 
might be well-designed and fiscally sound, but if it is not able to cover its target 
population, then it fails in its basic objective of providing income security. However, 
definitional differences, data issues and other biases ensure that there is no universally 
accepted measure of coverage. There are two phases of human life during which 
measurement of coverage is relevant: coverage for the working or economically active 
population, and coverage for the elderly. A brief discussion on the issues involved in 
measuring coverage in each phase follows. 
 
Coverage for the economically active population 
In countries like Chile with a mandatory defined contribution system, coverage is usually 
measured with reference to the economically active population; as each person in this 
category is expected to contribute to the system in order to secure his future pension. 
Official coverage data typically relies on ratios of population actually covered to 
population that should potentially be covered under the system, thus measuring any “gap” 
or population “left out” of the system. For instance, SAFP provides time-series data on 
the number of members in the AFP system as a proportion of the force. The association 
of AFPs uses the ratio of contributors to employed persons to measure coverage. The 
problem with this definition is a direct result of the pension design: in Chile, being a 
contributor need not be synonymous with being covered (in the sense of having a right to 
receive benefits), because the number of contributions may be insufficient to guarantee 
even a minimum pension. Alternately, some non-contributors may actually be “covered” 
by the system because they may be entitled to the minimum pension after having 
contributed for twenty years.    33
 
The World Bank recommends three indicators for measuring coverage among workers in 
the economically active phase
40 : 
(i)  Contributors/Economically Active Persons – known as coverage of the labor 
force, and is a broad measure of the extent of social security available to the  
force 
(ii)  Contributors/Employed Persons – known as occupational coverage, which is a 
narrower measure than (i) as it recognizes that unemployed persons are not 
entitled to regular pensions under Chile’s DC system 
(iii)  Contributors/Wage Earners – called legal coverage, since contribution is 
mandatory for all wage earners, and this measure actually captures the extent 
to which national laws are being implemented  
 
Coverage for the elderly 
It is relatively easy to measure coverage for the elderly as it simply involves identifying 
the number of individuals among the elderly who are actually receiving pension benefits. 
Thus a standard measure would be the ratio of elderly population receiving pension 
benefits to the total elderly population. Some studies advocate a “joint coverage” measure 
for the elderly, which counts spouses of benefit recipients as covered persons; or a ‘joint 
occupational coverage’, which also includes among covered elderly those who remain 
employed and their spouses. The last measure is sufficiently broad and inclusive, and it is 
reasonably certain that those elderly who do not qualify as ‘covered’ under this measure 
are persons who do depend on savings or transfers for their survival.
41   
 
Trends in Coverage 
Coverage under the current pension system has been stagnant, and not substantially better 
than that under the old defined-benefit system. This pattern is observed irrespective of the 
indicator used to measure coverage.  Estimates based on the National Survey of Socio-
Economic Characteristics (CASEN) show that in 2003, only 58.7 percent of the 
economically active population, 64.7 percent of employed persons and 78.6 percent of 
wage earners were contributors and so had potential pension coverage; an achievement   34
that does not appear to be very different from the 50-60 percent coverage attained by the 
old DB system during 1975-77.
42  Valdes-Prieto (2004) estimated that for the period 
1990-2001, the average coverage rate was 28.7 percent for the AFP plans and 32.1 
percent for the AFP and INP plans combined
43. Official estimates of coverage are more 
optimistic, perhaps an outcome of using a different measurement technique. Table 15 
compares coverage of economically active persons from two different sources. Data in 
Table 16 shows that in 2003, 63 percent of the elderly persons were covered.  
 
In general, about 40 percent of employed persons did not or were not able to contribute 
towards an old age pension. This extent of non-contribution is startling: first, because in a 
DC system there is a direct link between contributions and pension accumulation and 
therefore a clear incentive to contribute, and second, because rules governing Chile’s 
system mandates contributions from all employees. 
 
Reasons for Low Coverage 
It is necessary to study coverage data in some detail to understand the reasons for the 
lower-than-expected coverage. Disaggregated data reveal that coverage appears to 
improve with educational levels, income, and size of establishment; as well as vary with 
gender and residence, both for elderly and economically active persons. Persons with 
secondary and tertiary education, higher income, persons working in medium and large 
sized establishments, urban residents and men have relatively higher coverage
44. Valdes-
Prieto(2004) showed that higher fixed commissions charged by AFPs reduced coverage, 
perhaps because it discouraged self-employed and economically inactive people who may 
be considering entering the covered sector. Coverage was found to improve with 
economic growth.  
In general, the most vulnerable in terms of low coverage are women; independent 
workers, which includes the self-employed as well as workers without formal labor 
contracts; and the very poor, especially in rural areas. An examination of the labor market 
structure in Chile reinforces this result (Table 17). The Chilean economy has been 
characterized by fairly high unemployment (8-10 percent). There is frequent movement 
between jobs, and between the formal and informal sectors. Some evidence of the extent   35
of movement between employment categories is obtained from the HLSS 2002 survey - 
for example, among persons who worked as salaried workers in some month, 17% also 
worked as self-employed (at least one month in their employment history of the last 20 
years), 2.8% as employers, 5.7% as domestic workers and less than 1% as non-
remunerated family members. Among those who reported having had at least one month 
as independent workers, 74% also worked as salaried workers
45.  
 
As markets undergo transformation due to globalization, Chilean employees also face 
shorter  contracts, greater job rotation and uncertain employment. As employment 
becomes less stable, workers are more likely to contribute irregularly, if at all, into their 
pension accounts.  The experience of other countries shows that people contribute only 
when they have to; in fact, having a formal employment contract appears to be critical to 
participation in the pensions system. In Chile, about 95 percent of the self-employed, who 
constitute more than a quarter of the workforce, do not contribute. Consequently, self-
employment explains most of the non-contribution from the male members of the 
workforce. Female participation in the formal workforce is relatively poor and 
characterized by long gaps that occur when women leave formal employment to care for 
their families.  
 
Contribution and consequently coverage is lesser among low-income workers. Arenas de 
Mesa and Mesa-Lago (2006) observe that when coverage of employed persons is 
stratified by gender and income quintiles, the richest men and women had coverage of 
77.1 percent and 84.4 percent respectively; whereas the poorest male and female workers 
had corresponding ratios of 53.8 and 49.8 percent. Low income which may be inadequate 
for consumption is in itself a disincentive for saving; but there are other reasons to expect 
lower participation from low-income workers. Poorer persons may expect to live shorter 
lives and hence may feel that they would not require pension, or may prefer to rely on 
traditional retirement supports such as children and family savings. Poverty is highly 
correlated with lower levels of education, and poor persons are more likely to be 
unskilled workers employed in the informal sector. Even for those in the formal sector, 
Chile’s MPG requirements provide the wrong incentives for low-income people. Workers   36
whose contribution history does not make them eligible for MPG may view the 
contributions as a tax, and prefer to evade it. Workers who are able to make 20 years of 
contributions are economically better off by not making further contributions, either 
because the extra contributions are not expected to raise pension payments above MPG, 
or because the worker can generate better returns by drawing the MPG and moving into 
the informal system for continued employment.  
 
 
(3) Contribution  Density 
A defined contribution system, by its very definition, can be successful only if people 
make regular contributions. Indicators of coverage are based on number of contributors, 
where a contributor is defined as an affiliate who has made at least one contribution in the 
preceding twelve months. A better interpretation of coverage and the probability of 
securing pension benefits can be obtained by measuring ‘contribution density’, or the 
number of months in which an individual has made social security contributions as a 
proportion of months of membership in the system.  
 
A household survey conducted in 2002, the Historia al y Seguridad Social (HLSS), 
which surveyed 17,246 individuals affiliated to the retirement system at any time during 
1981-2001, found that on an average a member contributed to the pension system in 52 
percent of months
46. This is in sharp contrast to the 80 percent level that was expected 
when the pension system was designed. The distribution pattern of contribution density is 
bimodal, rather than uniform: while 20 percent of both men and women have a 
contribution density of over 90 percent; contribution density is close to 0 percent for 
about 15 percent of the population.  The survey also highlighted gender, age, education-
based and income-driven differences in contribution density. On an average, the 
contribution density of men (59.8) was 16 percentage points higher than that of women 
(43.8). Members with higher education levels and income levels tended to have higher 
contribution density; as did those in the 45-65 years age group.  Employees with   
contracts, those working in larger establishments, and those employed in non-agricultural 
sectors (secondary and tertiary sectors) exhibited higher contribution densities. The   37
employed showed higher contribution density (60.8%) as compared to the self-employed 
(45.1%). These results are consistent with trends observed with coverage indicators, and 
suggest that there is a need to improve contribution density, if coverage is to be enhanced 
among regular contributors, and increased among the others. 
 
(4) Replacement  Rate 
 
Adequacy of pension income is an important indicator of the effectiveness of a pension 
system- and closely linked to coverage. Adequacy is usually measured in terms of 
replacement rate- or the proportion of pre-retirement remuneration provided by pension 
benefits. The replacement rate is calculated on the basis of the amount of funds 
accumulated in a member’s account at retirement, which in turn depends on a member’s 
income and the real growth of income during the contribution period, real returns on 
pension accumulations, fixed and variable commissions, age at retirement and 
contribution density. Given identical pension fund balances at retirement, women in 
general may receive lower pensions because they retire earlier and have a higher life 
expectancy.  
 
Official Chilean projections usually assume a contribution density of 70-90 percent; an 
assumption that yields fairly high replacement rates (close to 75 percent), even with 
conservative assumptions for the other factors. It has been pointed out that an average 
worker who contributes for all 40 years of his working life and retires at age 65 will get a 
price-indexed pension that is 60 percent of his final wage, assuming his account earned a 
5 percent rate of return; and if he began contributing 25 years ago when the system 
earned a 10 percent average rate of return it has yielded since inception, his pension 
would be 85 percent of his final wage
47. However, other studies have computed 
replacement rate using more realistic assumptions for contribution density and found 
substantially lower replacement rates. A series of simulations based on HLSS survey data 
indicated that for an average unmarried man, an 80 percent contribution density would 
provide a replacement rate figure of 58 percent; but a drop in contribution density to 60 
percent (which is closer to actually observed numbers) would push the replacement rate   38
to as low as 44 percent. The corresponding rates for an average female worker: 43 
percent and 23 percent respectively are even more startling
48.  
 
The actual situation could be even worse than the most cautious simulations, because of 
the widespread practice of seeking early retirement among AFP members. More than a 
third of the pensions are paid to members seeking early retirement; on an average, men 
have brought forward their retirement age by 9 years and women by 6 years
49. Estimates 
of the Association of AFPs indicate that for each year that retirement age is brought 
forward relative to the legal age, the amount of pension available reduces by 7 to 10 
percent.  This phenomenon further reduces the replacement rate actually experienced in 
Chile. Authorities generally attribute the trend towards early retirement to factors such as 
unemployment and layoffs, the attractiveness of annuities and lack of information about 
retirement saving. However, it is being recognized now that at least some members 
optimize their retirement financing by exiting early from the system and drawing down 
the minimum pension, while simultaneously staying employed outside the system, or 
investing their savings in more profitable alternatives.  
 
 (5)  Gender Dimensions 
Gender dimensions of pension design have become increasingly important, especially in 
ageing societies where women are often observed to have lower access to pensions and 
government assistance programs as compared to men. Chile’s defined contribution 
system, which directly links working-life contributions to retirement benefits, was 
expected to increase work-force participation, contributions and thus pensions across 
gender. However, owing to demographic differences between genders, and due to the 
nature of their participation in the market, women appear to be at a disadvantage as 
compared to men.   
 
The participation of women in Chile’s labor force is considerably lower than that of men. 
James, Edwards and Wong (2003) pointed out that the ratio of employed women to the 
working age population of Chile was only 38 percent, whereas the ratio of employed men   39
to working age population was 75.2 percent. Less than half of the working women were 
affiliated with the social security system, as compared with two-thirds of men; largely 
because women were more likely to be employed in part-time jobs or in the informal 
sector
50. Studies have shown that women tend to earn less than men, even after 
controlling for age and education: the average monthly wage of a female worker, at 
US$245, was significantly lower than the average wage of US$335 earned by a male 
worker
51. Working life patterns of women show a typical pattern: during the first 10 to 20 
working years, the number of years contributed to the system shows an increasing trend 
across educational levels, but a steep drop in contributions is noticed at around 30 years 
of age for a majority of women. This indicates that many women drop out of the work 
force at that age to perform traditional roles of child-rearing and taking care of family. As 
expected, no such discontinuity is observed amongst male cohorts. Clearly, given these 
labor market conditions, a DC system that links retirement benefits to contributions 
would cover fewer women than men, and provide them with lesser end-benefits. 
 
Women are permitted to retire five years earlier than men in Chile, a rule that further 
reduces accumulations in their individual pension accounts. To compound this problem, 
women tend to live longer than men and since AFPs adjust for this factor actuarially, it 
implies that women are paid lower annuities
 52.   
 
Thus women have lower contribution densities, lower pension account accumulations, 
and as a result end up with lower replacement rate and lower pensions. Actuarial 
adjustment resulting out of earlier retirement and higher life-expectancy shaves off some 
more from expected benefits: an additional five years of contributions can increase the 
pension of an average female contributor by 50 percent. As a result annuities paid out to 
women are only about 30-40 percent of that paid to men; and about 45 percent of women 
will be entitled to a pension lower than the minimum pension
53. The worst affected 
women were those in the lowest income categories, those with no or minimal education, 
women in domestic service and those who were categorized as unpaid family workers- 
these groups of women had significantly lower coverage as compared their male 
counterparts
54.   40
 
Yet despite these obvious gender biases in the Chilean pension system, the overall impact 
on women may be ameliorated by public transfers, the minimum pension guarantee and 
design features that mandate joint annuities and provide survivors pension.  Women are 
more likely to receive Government assistance programs and MPG top-ups, owing to their 
lower earning power. In fact, the twenty year contribution requirement for minimum 
pension might be an incentive for women to stay in the labor force. Even for women who 
drop out of the labor force, this system is beneficial because contributions in the early 
years have an increased weight relative to later contributions owing to compounding of 
interest.  
 
Women tend to outlive men, and since wives are usually younger than husbands, women 
may face widowhood of upto 5-10 years. Some financial protection is provided to 
Chilean women through mandatory joint annuitization: when husbands retire they are 
required to purchase joint annuities or gradual withdrawals spread over both lives. The 
survivor gets at least 60 percent of the primary benefit. Chile’s pension system permits 
widows to keep their pension benefits in addition to the survivors’ pension derived from 
their spouse’s contributions- an advantage that was not available in the old defined 
benefits scheme. Joint annuities add about 30 to 70 percent to the lifetime benefit of the 
average woman in all educational categories
55.  
 
When the benefits of joint annuities are included, the average female/male ratio of total 
lifetime benefits rises to 60-90 percent; and for women who contribute and work full 
lives, this ratio exceeds 100 percent. Thus when the system is considered in its entirety, 
the gender gap is narrowed. In fact, women get a higher relative benefit in this system as 
compared to the old defined benefit scheme. 
 
 
3.6  Rationale for reform: Challenges within the existing pension system 
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The 1981 reform created a homogenous pension system for Chilean civilians, in which 
each worker was responsible for building up his/her pension fund. For the first time in the 
history of pension reform, a publicly managed defined-benefit system was replaced by a 
privately-run defined contribution system at the national level. That the shift was 
achieved without serious fiscal imbalances, and quickly accepted by the vast majority of 
workers, is in itself a laudable achievement.  
 
The individual capitalization system has worked fairly efficiently for twenty five years. 
AFPs collect contributions, invest them in accordance with increasingly liberal norms, 
and pay out pensions. Pension funds are financially sound: in twenty-five plus years of 
operation, there are no reports of bankruptcy or frauds.  
 
State participation is minimal, restricted to providing a safety net for the poor and 
indigent elderly, and for workers with inadequate accumulations. State intervention 
through the regulatory body, SAFP, is carried out in order to ensure transparency and 
minimize risk.  The development of pension funds has facilitated financial deepening, 
provided incentives to save and financed capital projects. Pension coverage in Chile is 
one of the highest in the region. 
 
Thus there is no structural crisis in the system. Yet the Government of Chile, under the 
leadership of President Bachelet, introduced significant changes to the existing system. 
The proposed reform is widely perceived to be necessary, and in the right direction, 
although there is considerable divergence about the details.   
 
In order to understand the rationale for another round of reform, we examine outcomes 
arising as a result of the system design, nature of the pension funds market, regulation 
and externalities, and consider deviations from what was expected or promised at the 
time of reform. 
 
(1) Design 
   42
Chile’s pension system was designed as a “multi-pillar” structure. The first pillar operates 
through two instruments – the minimum pension guarantee and PASIS. As is the norm 
worldwide, the Chilean first pillar is administered by the government and mostly funded 
through tax revenue. Its primary objective is to prevent poverty in no or low income 
cohorts. The second pillar facilitates consumption-smoothing through a privately-
managed and public-mandated defined contribution scheme. Finally, a third pillar 
consisting of instruments promoting voluntary savings encourages additional savings for 
retirement.  
 
The multiple pillar model of social security, strongly endorsed by the World Bank, has 
been adopted by many countries that reformed their pension systems. The model was 
expected to lead to greater coverage by establishing a clear link between contributions 
and benefits. Other positive outcomes included reductions in effective tax rates, evasion 
and labor market distortions
56. Pension literature is clear about the benefits of this system: 
but the experience of reforming countries in Latin America suggests that the ability of the 
system to achieve predicted outcomes is highly dependent on country specific factors 
such as labor market conditions, attitudes of affiliates, efficiency of fund administrators 
as well as macro-economic factors.  
 
In Chile’s case, both the first and second pillars have yielded worse-than-expected 
outcomes. We now evaluate the challenges faced in each pillar. 
 
Individual Capitalization Accounts and AFPs 
 
Chile’s system was designed to be predominantly contributions-driven, and it is 
inevitable for it to show poor outcomes if contributions are lower than expected. Thus 
poor and irregular contributors such as women, self-employed persons, workers in the 
informal economy and extremely low-income workers are the categories that are at 
greatest risk of not being covered by the second pillar. This outcome is largely a result of 
a mismatch between assumptions that were made at that time of setting up the system and 
actual  labor market conditions.    43
 
The efficiency of pension system design is contingent upon demographic and labor 
market projections that are made when the system was designed. The Chilean system was 
designed for full time workers with steady employment and contribution histories (and 
thus implicitly male). An average man was not expected to live much beyond the 
retirement age of 65 years. Women formed less than 30 percent of the labor force and 
were likely to be financially dependent on their male partners. Given this demographic 
background, it was expected that a worker who contributes for 45 years with a 
contribution density of about 85 percent, would secure a replacement rate of 70-80 
percent, even assuming a modest 5 percent rate of return. An extension of this assumption 
to the entire workforce indicated a coverage rate of above 65 percent. 
 
However, changes in economic and social conditions have almost invalidated these 
assumptions. Chilean society is rapidly ageing, and more people, especially women, are 
living well into their eighties.  force participation rate of women has increased 
significantly, as have the number of single-parent families. The labor market is no longer 
characterized by long-term employment; instead there are a large number of temporary 
jobs that may not have employment contracts. Women, typically, often work part-time or 
seasonal jobs. A 2006 Survey shows that 19.3 percent of male wage earners and 26.2 
percent of female wage earners are employed without a firm employment contract
57. It is 
no coincidence that women, very young workers (age group 15 to19 years) and workers 
in the lowest income decile were the most likely to be employed without a firm 
employment contract.  
 
Low income workers are not motivated to save for old age due to various reasons, some 
of which were discussed in earlier sections of this paper. A comparison of employment 
conditions of the lowest two income deciles with the highest two reveals clearly how the 
poor are excluded from the system (Table 18). The lowest income households report the 
maximum percentages of non-contractual employment as well as employment, both 
conditions not conducive to pension contributions. 
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Job rotation, frequent retrenchments, and overall employment insecurity are established 
features of the labor market. There is constant movement between formal and informal 
sectors; and a growing tendency to take early retirement, at least from the formal, 
pension-linked sector. Once a worker is in the informal sector, the chances of his 
participation in the system decline dramatically.  This is evident from the contribution 
record of self-employed workers: 95 percent of workers in this category are not affiliated 
to the system. As a result of all these uncertainties, actual contribution densities and 
number of years of contributions are much lower than was envisaged, and so is the 
replacement rate. Table 19 sums up the differences between assumed and actual features 
of the system. The system ends up providing a replacement rate of less than 50 percent.  
 
Projections of pensions expected to be earned by the cohort of 2020-2025 show that only 
52 percent of members are expected to have accumulated sufficient funds to generate 
pensions higher than the minimum pension. Of the remaining, the MPG top up program 
will apply to only 2 percent, and the remaining 48 percent will have to depend on own 
savings or handouts
58. Owing to lower contribution density and lower participation in the 
labor force, the projections for women are even starker: 61 percent of women will not 
receive even the minimum pension.  
 
 
Non-contributory pension benefits 
The first pillar plays a critical role in maintaining equity, because it complements the DC 
pillar by preventing poverty among those who are cannot participate in, or are not 
adequately provided for by the contributory system. Chile’s first pillar is linked with the 
second, because eligibility to the government’s minimum pension guarantee requires 
twenty years of contributions into the DC system. This design feature precludes the MPG 
from being a “pure” social assistance instrument. More importantly, it introduces 
perverse incentives that distort the labor market, as members either tend to contribute just 
enough to qualify for the MPG, or are so discouraged by the holding period that they 
evade contributions. The former tendency is observed even among workers earning 
average and above average incomes- those who are least likely to suffer old age poverty-   45




The PASIS program is the purely unfunded component of the first pillar, and is a means-
tested program targeted at the elderly indigent. There are two areas of concern with 
PASIS. First, the amount of funds appropriated for PASIS is strictly limited by the budget, 
and so the number of pensions awarded is rationed. Thus all those who pass the means-
test are not guaranteed to receive state support; in effect, most do not do so. Second, the 
PASIS benefit is itself quite low, set roughly equal to the poverty line.  
 
Poverty in general has declined in Chile, and so has poverty among the elderly (defined 
here as persons above 60 years). A series of CASEN surveys reveal that overall poverty 
has reduced from 38.6 percent of the population in 1990 to 13.7 percent in 2006: in the 
same period incidence of old-age poverty declined from 20.6 percent to 7.5 percent 
(Table 20). Thus the decline in old age poverty is commensurate with the improvement in 
overall standards of living. Yet non-contributory benefits have not fully succeeded in 
pooling the risk of old age poverty. In 2003 up to 40 percent of the elderly poor in urban 
areas and 15 percent in rural areas were not supported by the system. Integrating the 
poorest elderly into the system is a challenge for the Chilean government. 
 
 
(2) Industry efficiency 
  
Improving pension coverage is probably the greatest task faced by Chilean authorities, 
but ensuring that pension funds operate efficiently is also important, especially because 
research shows a link between actual and perceived high commissions and poor 
participation in the system. If costs of securing a pension benefit are high, it is likely that 
those who are not mandated to participate, such as self-employed workers, and workers 
in informal jobs will not be motivated to contribute to the system
60.  Further, if high costs 
are a result of lack of competition, then coverage, costs and competition – the three most 
debated outcomes of Chilean reform- are linked to one another
61.   46
 
Supply Side Restrictions 
There is sufficient evidence that the AFP market in Chile has low competition. The 
industry has reported consistent above-normal profits since inception, barring the first 
year of operation (Table 21). The operational profit margin of AFPs has consistently 
exceeded 10 percent, and has actually been higher than 25 percent since 1999. Yet there 
was almost no decrease in the variable commission charged in this period (As shown in 
the last column of table 21). In terms of return on capital, AFPs performed better than the 
financial system as a whole, except for a brief stretch in 1994-96 when a commercial war 
between AFPs triggered off some competition between existing AFPs and new entrants.  
 
The low competitiveness of the AFP market is also indicated by the fact that no new AFP 
entered the market during the highly profitable period of 1996-2002.  This could be 
because the system shows continuously declining average costs, and new entrants to the 
market face closure if they are not able to quickly garner a sizeable number of 
contributors
62. Thus economies of scale created significant barriers to entry. The 
vulnerability of smaller, newer fund managers was most apparent during the early 
nineties, when a vigorous surge in promotional expenditure and spending in “kind” led to 
a sales war. It was a war in which the legal norm of homogenous pricing was never 
violated, but the expensive gifts given to attract contributors were equivalent to steep 
price discounts. Expenditure incurred on sales promotional efforts and salaries of sales 
personnel was as high as 36 percent of fee income in 1997. None of the new aspiring AFPs 
survived this war, in fact, a wave of buyouts and mergers led to further concentration. It 
has been argued that threat of a commercial war is itself a significant entry barrier for fund 
managers desirous of setting up AFPs. 
 
Demand Characteristics 
Demand for pension savings with AFPs is highly inelastic. A recent survey found that 
fewer than 2 percent of the respondents knew either the fixed or variable commissions in 
either year; and only 0.5 percent were knowledgeable about both commissions
63. Some of 
the indifference is a result of market regulation, because the product offered by AFPs is   47
mandatory and until 2002 (when multiple funds were launched) the only decision 
variable was the choice of AFP. There is also widespread myopia with respect to 
retirement planning, which has not altered despite twenty five plus years of pension 
reform. An estimation of the demand curve for AFP products revealed significant price-
inelasticity; demand for transfers was affected only by sales efforts and entrance 
premiums
64; the financial performance, brand strength or fees of the AFP made no 
difference to member choices.  Since AFPs continued to earn large profits, their sales 
expenditure was financed by maintaining fees and commissions at a high level, taking 
advantage of apparent member apathy to fees. Thus in the absence of competitive 
pressures or price elasticity AFPs do not have an incentive to reduce fees or operate at 
optimal efficiency levels
65.   
 
High commission costs can significantly impact workers’ returns. When returns earned 
on member contributions are valued net of fees and commissions, they are considerably 
lower than the “gross” returns that are usually highlighted. In fact, it has been pointed out 
that SAFP regularly overstates AFP returns by calculating them without taking into 
account the fixed and variable commissions paid by contributors. For instance, as on July 
2002, the actual return earned by a member who entered the system in 1982 would be 6.1 
percent; and not the 10.5 percent annual return that is commonly quoted by SAFP sources 
for that period. The adjusted “net” return numbers are so low that during some periods, a 
member could hypothetically earn higher returns simply by placing his funds in a bank 
deposit
66.  Although pension funds do not compete on costs, ignorance of such 
information hinders optimal choices by members, and hampers market efficiency by 
allowing the high-cost situation to continue.  
 
 
(3) Investment  Limits 
Strict investment regulation has probably played an indirect role in increasing costs and 
decreasing competition. While limits on type of instrument and restrictions on authorized 
markets are being liberalized cautiously, the nature of investment continues to be 
excessively controlled. There are 97 limits prescribed for each fund (Table 22). Research   48
shows that such quantitative restrictions have significant costs. Simulations have shown 
that in the absence of these regulations, AFPs would have opted for riskier portfolios by 
investing more in equity and foreign instruments, and consequently earned higher returns. 
Investment regulation was found to be equivalent to an annual tax of 5 percent on the 
pension wealth of affiliates
67. 
 
However, it is the ‘band of return’ rule that directly discourages competition by forcing 
AFPs to maintain portfolios similar to their competitors
68. The investment herding 
observed among funds almost eliminates product diversity and consequently, and reduces 
competition.  
  
Thus there are challenges both on the demand and supply side. On the demand side, 
pubic awareness on AFP services and costs needs to be improved so that affiliates can 
make informed choices. On the supply side, the challenge will be to reduce costs and 
enhance competition without compromising on service quality or prudential risk limits.    49
4. The Marcel Commission Report 
 
Reform of Chile’s existing pension reform was a key election promise of President 
Michelle Bachelet, and, upon assuming office in March 2006, it was given top priority. A 
Presidential Advisory Council was convened under the Chairmanship of economist Mario 
Marcel with the objective of assessing the current pension system and providing 
suggestions to overcome its weaknesses. The Council was composed of fifteen experts 
with different professional and political backgrounds. The report was prepared after an 
intense period of consultation that included 49 hearings, 73 organizations, 250 leaders 
and experts and three opinion surveys, in addition to thousands of comments and 
suggestions made through web-based interfaces. The massive number of organizations 
and persons who contributed directly and indirectly in generating these reform proposals, 
constitute one of the most complete experiences of citizen participation known in Chile 
around the formulation of public policies
69. The Commission submitted its report in July 
2006, with detailed proposals for reform of the social security system. The report was 
subsequently evaluated by an Inter-Ministerial Committee, and passed without significant 
modifications. In March 2008, President Bachelet signed the legislation establishing the 
new pension scheme.  
 
The Marcel Commission proposed a system of social security that would minimize the 
risk of poverty by providing universal pension coverage. At the same time, the reform 
aimed for significant increases in replacement rate, greater participation of workers in 
financing their retirement, improved institutional efficiency and greater competition in 
the pension fund industry. It was emphasized that the reform would maintain fiscal 
sustainability and responsibility – the Government “promised that benefits are not 
granted one year if they cannot be sustained in the following years”
70.  
 
In order to fulfill its task, the Commission carried out an exhaustive study of the Chilean 
pension system, identifying its strengths, weaknesses and the major challenges. The key 
areas of concern were the low density of contributions, especially among independent 
and self-employed workers, resulting in low national coverage; inequitable pension   50
benefits for women and poor workers; investment performance and operational efficiency 
of fund managers and member awareness of the pension system.  From this diagnosis and 
based on the goals, 70 proposals of reform were elaborated, covering 11 areas as stated 
below:  
1.  New Solidarity Pillar 
2.  Coverage, Contribution density and compliance 
3.  Gender Equity  
4.  Competition and organization of the APF industry of AFP  
5.  Competition and prices  
6.  Investment of pension funds 
7.  Strengthening Contributory Pensions  
8.  Enlargement of the voluntary pillar  
9.  Education and information  
10. Institutional Strengthening  
11. Financial Discipline 
 
Recommendations for reform in the above areas are elaborated below. The reform 
proposals are broadly grouped by the challenges discussed in section 3.6, with a view to 
assessing the Marcel Commission’s recommendations against the system’s acknowledged 
challenges.  
 
4.1 Improving  Coverage 
 
A. System Design 
The new Chilean pension model is to be based on a three pillared structure. The defining 
feature of the current Chilean system- contributions-based individual capitalization 
accounts- will be retained, but significant modifications are proposed for the other two 
pillars. The first level of social security will be provided by a government financed social 
safety net called the Solidarity pillar. The basic design of the contributory second pillar 
will remain unchanged, although its scope will be widened to cover currently excluded 
workers. The third pillar will be composed of additional voluntary savings for those   51
contributors who wish to enhance accumulations in their pension funds beyond the 
mandated limits.  
 
(1) Solidarity Pillar 
A new System of Solidarity Pensions (SPS
71) will replace the existing PASIS scheme and 
the Minimum Pension Guarantee provided by the government. The aim of creating this 
pillar is to provide universal pension coverage to all Chileans and to minimize old-age 
poverty by supporting those with lower capacities of contributing towards their pensions.   
 
The SPS will benefit men and women aged 65 years and above, belonging to the poorest 
60 percent of the population. Additionally, in order to be eligible for SPS benefits, the 
applicant should have lived 20 years in Chile, in particular during the five years 
preceding the application. The main benefits under the SPS include the Universal Basic 
Pension (PBU
72) and the Solidarity Contribution (APS). From July 1, 2008, all persons 
who did not contribute to the system, and have no other source of pension, will receive a 
minimum solidarity pension if eligible for SPS. Such persons will receive a Basic 
Pension amounting to CLP 60,000 (USD111) per month, which will increase to CLP 
75,000 (USD 139) by 2009. Persons who have some contributory pension and are eligible 
under SPS, will receive a ‘complementary’ top up that will decline as the member’s own 
pension increases, and will finally cease when the self-financed contributory pension 
reaches the Maximum Pension with Solidarity Contribution (PMAS
73). The PMAS will 
be set at CLP 60,000 (USD 111) per month in 2008, and will rise to CLP 200,000 
(USD371) per month by 2012. PMAS values during the five-year transition period are 
shown in table 23. The rate of ‘withdrawal’ of the complementary top up is designed in 
such a way that total pension always increases in response to higher contributory effort. 
 
Figure 2 provides a geometrical representation of the proposed SPS plan. At zero levels 
of own pension, an eligible resident has access to the minimum pension. As his self-
financed pension increases (as shown along the horizontal axis), the amount of state 
support provided declines (as indicated by the downward sloping line). When self-
financed pension reaches the PMAS level, state support is completely withdrawn. This   52
strategy ensures two things: first, poverty prevention for those who are unable to save for 
old age or disability; and second, state encouragement for those who contribute even 
small amounts towards their pension, by rewarding them with complementary amounts. 
Thus the SPS proposal aims to improve replacement rate for lower income cohorts, and 
in some senses, ‘smoothen’ the replacement rate path across all cohorts.  
 
Expected Outcome  
The groups that would benefit most from this proposal include workers with low 
contribution densities; the workers with relatively volatile income, such as seasonal 
workers and independent workers; the people who have dedicated an important part of 
their active lives to unremunerated home work such as the care of children, old people or 
disabled relatives; less-educated workers; and old people with very low pensions.  
 
According to projections of the Commission, when the system would start operating in 
2008, 510 thousand people or about 40 percent of the population over 65 years will 
receive a Basic Solidarity pension. This represents an increase of 100 thousand people 
over the current number of beneficiaries of Assistance Pensions. By the fifth year of 
operation, it is expected that 60 percent of the poorest in Chile or over 1 million persons 
will benefit from the Scheme.  
 
The Scheme’s other advantage is that by creating a link between the smallest marginal 
contributions and additional pensions received, it maintains the incentive to make regular 
contributions. The Solidarity pension is integrated smoothly into the contributory scheme.  
Thus if workers contribute regularly to their individual pension accounts, the contributing 
pillar assures a worthy pension to them. If for some reason they do not contribute at all or 
do so infrequently, then they are supported by the solidarity pillar that not only 
guarantees a basic pension, but also assures higher pensions based on their contributions. 
 
 
(2) Voluntary Pillar   53
The main component of the voluntary pillar of the present pension system is the Ahorro 
Voluntary Previsional (APV), which came into effect on 1 March 2002 under law Nº 
19,768. APV balances have grown at an annualized rate of 35 percent between 2002 and 
2005, reaching US$1.9 million in December 2005. Unfortunately, utilization of APV 
tends to be highly correlated with income: 26.1 percent of high-income contributors to 
the AFP system made APV contributions in 2005, but only 2.7 percent of low-income 
contributors used APV. In fact, voluntary pension-related savings are also a very small 
fraction of total financial voluntary savings, currently accounting for only 5.2 percent of 
the total.  
 
Thus the most important reform proposed by the committee is a measure to make the 
APV more inclusive: currently only those independent workers who are affiliated to an 
AFP are permitted to contribute to an APV, this restriction is to be removed to allow 
access to all independent workers. 
 
Additional proposals for strengthening the voluntary pillar can be grouped under two 
categories: fiscal incentives to promote additional voluntary savings within the current 
system; and provisions for new voluntary savings plans. The reform proposes to (i) 
exempt low income individuals from paying tax (at 3 percent) on early withdrawals from 
their voluntary accounts and (ii) abolish taxes on commissions paid to voluntary savings 
account providers. Further, legislation will be put in place to ensure that funds left in 
voluntary pension savings accounts form a part of inheritance estates. The reform bill 
also includes a provision for new employer sponsored voluntary pension plans, known as 
Ahorro Previsional Voluntario Colectivo (APVC), which would collect contributions 
from both employers and employees. Employers would be permitted to set up more than 
one APVC plan, if it is approved by a majority of workers. The APVC plans would be 
non-discriminatory, implying that the plans must be open, in equal conditions, to all the 
workers of the company who wish to participate in them. 
 
The changes proposed to the APV are expected to sustain the high rates of growth 
demonstrated by this product since its creation, and also enable larger proportion of   54
workers to take advantage of its benefits. The creation of a legal framework for a 
collective employer-employee plan such as the APVC will provide an important alternate 
form of saving and broaden the Chilean pension market.  
 
B. Integrating non-participating sections 
 
The implicit foundation of a traditional pension system is a working man who heads his 
household and earns a stable wage, and contributes throughout his life to his pension 
account to support himself and his family in old age. But reality in Chile is quite 
different- personal labor histories reveal that periods of wage-earning alternate frequently 
with periods when the worker is independent or unemployed. Thus it becomes difficult to 
integrate workers who do not correspond to traditional expectations of employment and 
contribution into the pension system.  
 
Coverage and contribution density is the lowest among self-employed workers and 
informal sector workers, and among those in the lowest income categories. The reform 
proposes to integrate these marginalized workers through the following measures.  
 
•  All workers classified as “non-wage earners” will be integrated into the 
capitalization system by granting them the same benefits and obligations as wage 
earners. Thus equal access will be provided for child benefits; work injury 
insurance, old age and disability benefits and equal tax treatment of contributions 
will be practiced. However, non-wage earners will be expected to compulsorily 
affiliate with the system, rather than participate on a voluntary basis.  
•  Affiliation of self-employed and informal workers will place over a transition 
period of, for example, five years, which will be used to (a) educate, inform and 
motivate independent workers to contribute (b) implement incentives and agreed 
mechanisms of contribution (c) develop sectoral strategies of incorporation of 
independent workers (d) develop suitable mechanisms of collection and (e) 
construct data bases that help to maintain effective control of the collection 
process. The Council estimates that a process of gradual transition will be   55
necessary to instill the concept of retirement savings among independent workers 
and enable them to know more about the system and its benefits so that workers 
would participate in a motivated and informed manner. 
 
•  In order to encourage younger workers and new entrants to participate in the 
individual retirement account system, the reform proposes a monthly subsidy 
equivalent to 50 percent of the effective monthly contributions during the first 24 
months of contributions for all low income workers. The subsidy will be 
applicable to all workers between 18 and 35 years of age, and with an income 
below 1.5 times the minimum wage. 
 
These measures when implemented will permit the individual capitalization system to 
incorporate workers who work in conditions of total or partial informality, under the 




4.2 Gender  Equity 
 
Women have not benefited from the Chilean pension system to the same extent as men. 
According to results of Surveys of Social Protection, the most important reason for the 
gender gap is that women tend to drop out of the workforce to care for their families, 
followed by a tendency for women to work independently or stay unemployed. Thus 
recommendations of the Council that seek to improve coverage and contribution density 
of independent and self-employed workers will automatically help women. The 
establishment of the universal basic pension will also be an important step towards 
gender equity, because women will account for about 60 percent of the people being 
eligible for the new solidarity pillar. In addition, the Council has recommended some 
changes to the existing system in order to specifically reduce gender inequalities in 
pension benefits. These are summarized below:   56
•  In case of divorce, the accumulated balance of payments in individual accounts of 
each spouse to be divided 
•  Male spouses and unmarried fathers of legally recognized children to be 
recognized as beneficiaries of life insurance 
•  Separate disability insurance contracts for women and men in order to eliminate 
cross-subsidy from women to men. The premium on disability insurance, which 
factors into commissions paid to AFPs, tends to be lower for women as compared 
to men due to lesser accidents and higher life expectancy of women. 
•  Authorize AFPs to grant discounts to the commission that the women receive, 
accumulating the difference in its account of capitalization. 
•  Allow cross-contributions within households 
•  Provide a maternity bonus equivalent to one year of contributions over minimum 
wage for each child for women belonging to 60 percent of poorest households, 
irrespective of their contribution history  
•  Evaluate the possibility of using unisex mortality tables for annuities. This will 
involve cross-subsidy from men to women as a group. 
•  Equalize maximum coverage age for disability insurance at 65 years for both men 
and women 
•  Equalize retirement age of men and women over a transition period 
 
The objective of these proposals is to recognize the individuality and autonomy of 
women in the pension system, while discarding the historical idea that fixes a man at the 
centre and head of a household and relies excessively on intra-family transfers to provide 
for the needs of women. In order to ensure that the proposed system offers equal rights 
and obligations to both men and women, the Council proposed compensating 
mechanisms to correct distortions that create gender inequity. However, it was 
recognized that the suggested compensating mechanisms should preferably be expressed 
in terms of subsidies that do not distort labor markets nor create disincentives to 
remunerated work. Simulations carried out by the Council show that if the measures 
could be put in place effectively, the replacement rate of women would rise from the   57
present 16.3 percent to 61.3 percent, thus practically eliminating the gap between the 
projected replacement rates of men and women.  
 
4.3 Industry  Efficiency 
A. Competition 
 
The Marcel Commission pointed out that the AFP industry was not competitive in nature, 
and recommended measures for addressing challenges both on the supply and demand 
side. In order to allow AFPs to take better advantage of economies of scale and thereby 
reduce barriers to the entry, the Commission proposed some measures to re-organize the 
structure of AFPs. 
•  Remove restrictions on sub-contracting in order to separate the core fund 
management function of AFPs from the operational or service platform functions 
such as collection of contributions, account management, branch management, 
information disbursement. Operation and administration of AFPs is most efficient 
at large scales, but fund management does not benefit from economies of scale to 
the same extent. Hence AFPs can benefit from outsourcing large-scale activities 
such as back office operations and public handling, and focusing their resources 
on efficient investment management. 
 
•  Reinforce rules that seek to avoid conflicts of interest in the management of funds 
and marketing of pension services, so that when the AFP market is opened up to 
other agents (such as banks and financial institutions), their decisions are 
primarily in the interests of pensioners. Some proposals in this area include: 
¾  Tighten regulations against bundled sales, especially if AFP ownership is 
with a consumer credit supplier (for instance, a bank). 
¾  Commercial functions of AFPs and their controlling shareholders be 
strictly separated. 
¾  Investment and other operations between AFPs and related parties to be 
regulated. 
¾  Overall supervision of financial conglomerates to be consolidated.    58
 
 
On the demand side of the AFP industry, the Commission made the following 
recommendations with the objective of increasing price elasticity of demand, lowering 
barriers to entry and strengthening price-based competition 
 
•  Organize an annual tendering of AFPs for new members joining the individual 
capitalization scheme, such that the bid process will ensure that new members are 
assigned to the administrator that offers the lowest commission. Members would 
be required to remain with the successful AFP for a minimum of 18 months from 
the time of enrolment. This mechanism would allow over 200,000 workers to 
enter the system annually at the least cost. 
 
•  Further, the least-cost AFP would be obliged to offer the quoted price for existing 
members and those who enroll without participating in the bidding process. This 
ensures that the benefits of lower commission charges are extended to even those 
members who are not directly participating in the bidding process. 
 
•  Allow AFPs to offer ‘fidelity-based’ discounts on their commissions to members 
who remain with the same administrator for longer than 18 months.  
 
•  Facilitate the use of the internet to transfer between AFPs. This will reduce sales 
costs and generate genuine competition between administrators, as it will reduce 
the possibility of formation of collusive agreements. 
 
•  Fixed Commissions to be omitted. 
 
B. Investment 
The Council pointed out that effective management of pension funds was not only 
relevant to securing adequate future pension flows, but also critical for developing sound 
capital markets. Further, it was noted that the excessive detail and complexity found   59
currently in investment regulation restricts flexibility and puts the onus of responsibility 
on the authorities rather than the fund administrators. Lower yields as a result of 
undiversified portfolios impose implicit costs on the system and its members. Thus the 
proposals of the Council aim to create a regulatory framework that facilitates 
optimization of investment returns; by enhancing the yield on contributions to individual 
capitalization accounts while maintaining appropriate levels of risk. Some of the 
proposals are listed below: 
 
•  Simplify regulations pertaining to investment limits 
•  Introduce risk based limits as opposed to quantitative limits for pension fund 
investments 
•  Limit the role of legislature to establishing statutory limits on instrument 
eligibility and overall investment limits.   
•  Institute a Technical Council of Investments consisting of independent experts to 
deal with minor changes in portfolio limits and investment policies. This reform 
would reduce the need to seek government intervention for every policy change, 
and thus introduce flexibility in pension fund operations.  
•  Eliminate limits on overseas investments; and instead put in place risk-based 
currency exposure limits 
•  Change investment limits reserve requirements to allow more competition and 
reduce herding behaviour 
•  Make AFPs more accountable for investment policies 
 
 
4.4 Institutional  Strengthening 
 
The present pension system in Chile is characterized by considerable dispersion of 
regulatory authority. The institutions involved in regulating the system include the 
Superintendencia de Seguridad Social (SUSESO), SAFP, Directorate of Budgets, the 
General Treasury of the Republic, the Ministry of Planning (MIDEPLAN), the Institute 
of Normalizacio'n Previsional (INP) and other Municipalities and public institutions.   60
Institutional responsibilities appear to be weakly delineated, and there is scope for greater 
cohesion and co-ordination. Though this network of institutions exists to oversee 
management of individual pension accounts, there is no institutional body through which 
individual members can express their views about the functioning of the system. Thus the 
Council put forward a set of recommendations to create an integrated and rational 
institutional structure that works with efficiency and effectiveness to meet the goals of 
the system. 
 
•  Unify all regulatory authorities responsible for the pension system into a single 
Superintendency which will be responsible for ensuring the rights of affiliates, 
regulating the operation of administrators, integrating member data bases and to 
promote knowledge about the system. This institution will necessarily need to be 
invested with the authority and autonomy necessary to perform its functions 
consistently and capably. The Superintendency of Pensions could be organized 
into three divisions, each dealing with one pillar of the system
74.  
•  Create a committee of stakeholders, with representatives of workers, pensioners, 
employers and fund administrators. This committee should perform the function 
of an overall advisory board, and simultaneously be involved in information 
dissemination and pension education. 
•  Allocate responsibility for management of solidarity pillar to a public agency that 
may be created by the INP. 
•  To establish a centralized data base with the pension contribution history of each 
individual, which can be used in analysis, design and implementation of policies 
as well as future projections of fiscal commitments. 
•  Develop actuarial model to evaluate the effect of changes in the demographic and 
financial variables, contribution trends of affiliates and impact on fiscal 
commitments. Such a study could be carried out every five years to continually 
assess the outcomes of the reformed system. 
 
The institutional design set out by the Commission contemplates a clear demarcation of 
responsibilities between the organizations involved in administering benefits and those   61
protecting the rights of the users. This is not only expected to reduce regulatory 
uncertainty and thereby facilitate the entrance of new actors to the system, but also 
increase the legitimacy of the system for citizens of Chile.  
 
4.5  Education and Information 
 
The Commission perceived a need to create a public education campaign that informs the 
public about features, benefits and facilities available in the system. Workers should be 
motivated to participate in the pension system, and be fully aware of the incentives and 
benefits offered by the system and its requirements from workers. They should be 
capable of evaluating alternative lenders and decide suitably on the basis of information 
about costs, product quality, services and other specific features of the fund manager. 
With this objective, the following measures were recommended. 
 
•  Create a fund for pension education, financed with contributions from the 
AFPs and the state.  Each AFP is expected to contribute 0.035 percent of 
revenues monthly towards this fund, and the contribution will be matched by 
the state. It is estimated that the fund will amount to 5.2 million pesos per year.  
•  Committee of Users will periodically prioritize the disbursement of resources 
into publicity, diffusion, and education aspects of the information campaign  
•  Develop a network of accredited pension advisors to provide professional and 
independent support to the public. The remuneration of these advisors will not 
depend on members’ fund choices; with the result that member decisions will 
not be influenced by AFP-driven sales teams, though personal biases of 
advisors may influence choices.  
•  Induct people into the pension system at the end of secondary education; the 
induction would consist of educational exhibitions on the pension system. At 
the end of the induction, a notional contribution of 2 UF for opening an 
individual capitalization account would be provided by the state; this 
contribution would materialize only when actual individual contributions 
commence.    62
•  Include information about the pension system, with special focus on the rights 
and responsibilities of workers in all state funded  and training programs.  
•  Review the courses offered by Servicio Nacional de Capacitacion Y Empleo 
(SENCE) so that it provides more information on the pension system- 
currently very few of SENCE’s classes inform workers about the pension 
system.  
 
These proposals, once implemented, are expected to equip workers with the capacity to 
make informed decisions in a system that offers several choices. Further, by facilitating 
information disbursement and comparison between available pension options it is likely 
to improve the efficiency of the AFP industry.  
 
4.6 Fiscal  implications 
 
A.  Nature of Pension Flows in the Proposed System 
The reforms proposed by the Marcel Commission aim to move Chilean social security 
away from the current system, which relies excessively on the success of the individual 
capitalization system; to a more balanced system, structured on the basis of three 
integrated pillars: the solidarity pillar, the contributing pillar and the voluntary pillar.  
The present system is dominated by the contributing pillar; with publicly funded benefits 
providing only marginal support, and coverage of the voluntary system concentrated 
among affiliates with higher incomes. This structure results in a situation where 
disincentive or inability to contribute creates discontinuous spaces that constitute "traps 
of poverty". 
 
On the other hand, the model proposed by the Commission is characterized by a universal 
pension that supports affiliates with low or zero pension accumulations, but reduces 
gradually with a rise in individual accumulations.  Thus discontinuities in the existing 
system are eliminated without disincentives to contribution; while, simultaneously, 
reforms proposed to increase contribution density and improve investment returns   63
improve the efficiency of the contributory pillar. The voluntary pillar is expected to be 
enhanced by the introduction of the APVC, and reform of the APV.  
 
On the basis of the proposed structure, the flow of resources due to pensions financed 
with fiscal funds as well as accumulated balances of pension funds is projected for 2025, 
both with and without reform (Table 24). These projections reveal that in a scenario 
without reform, ratio of flow of pensions to GDP would be not be very different from the 
ratio in 2005, though the composition of pension flows would undergo a significant 
change.  
 
In 2005, publicly financed pension flows including pensions of the old system, minimum 
pension guarantee, welfare pensions and the accrued interests of recognition bonds 
constitute about 2.9 percent of the GDP; and the flow of pensions financed by the AFP 
system is only 1.1 percent. By 2025, as pensioners belonging to the old system will pass 
away and the outstanding stock of recognition bonds reduces, the transition to the AFP 
system will be almost complete. Thus public cost will reduce significantly to 1.6 percent 
of GDP, while the flow of pensions of the AFP system would have grown to 2.5 percent 
of GDP.  
 
However, if the proposals of the Marcel Commission are implemented, the resulting 
structure in 2025 will be more balanced. The contributing pillar would continue to be the 
main source of financing of pensions (at 2.9 percent of GDP), but the allocation of public 
resources towards pensions would be higher by almost 1 percent of GDP. 
 
 
B. Fiscal costs  
The gross incremental fiscal cost that will be incurred on implementing the 
Commission’s reform proposals would reach about 1.1 percent of GDP by 2025. If the 
anticipated savings in the first pillar (arising largely from the effects of higher 
contribution density and improved investment yield), which are estimated to be   64
approximately 0.2 percent of GDP are taken into account, then the net incremental fiscal 
cost of the reform proposals would be 0.9 percent of GDP in 2025.   
 
The most important component of incremental fiscal costs in the proposed system is the 
government’s basic minimum pension, which will form around 0.75 % of GDP in 2025. 
Other cost components include the proposed subsidy for young affiliates, tax effects of 
the extension of APV and creation of APVC, bonus on each live birth, creation of a fund 
for pension education and inclusion of state contribution with induction of affiliate into 
the system (Table 25).  
 
The additional fiscal commitment required under the proposed scheme is a direct result of 
the nature of fiscally financed benefits. A comparison of the probability of pensioners 
from each pension quintile receiving fiscally financed benefits without reform (via PMG 
and PASIS) and with reform (NPS) shows that the present scheme concentrates the 
probability of receiving state support in the first two quintiles, via PASIS, and in quintile 
3, via PMG. However, with the solidarity pillar, the probability of receiving state support 
stays until the fourth quintile, indicating that though the magnitude of state support grows 
as the capacity to save and generate a self-financed pension is reduced, intermediate 
layers of pensioners also receive some support. 
 
The Government expects to meet the additional fiscal commitments of the reformed 
system through the Pension Reserve Fund, from economic growth, the release of 
resources resulting from lower Government’s obligations with the old pension system, 
and, in the first five years, making use of part of the interest received by the financial 
assets held by the Government today. The Ministry of Finance has estimated that no new 
taxes will be needed to fund the increased social security provisions.  
 
Further, the reform will be funded in compliance with the Fiscal Responsibility Law and 
the mandate of maintaining 1 percent structural surplus
75. Since 2001, Chile’s fiscal 
policy has been guided largely by the framework established by the Fiscal Responsibility 
Act of 2006. This framework allocates part of the structural surplus to a Pension Reserves   65
Fund and an Economic and Social Stabilization Fund. The Pension Reserves fund will 
receive a maximum of 0.5 percent of the effective surplus from the previous year and a 
minimum of 0.2 percent of the effective surplus, even if the surplus is lower than that 
figure. The accumulations in the fund cannot be used for the first 10 years. Subsequently 
the fund will guarantee future pension liabilities.  
 
Both the Pension Reserve Fund and the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund would 
be managed by a fund manager to be selected through an international bidding process. 
The funds would invest in domestic and international bonds and local and foreign 
currency.  
The Pension Reserve Fund has recently been constituted with a US$600 million 
contribution. It is expected that some technical adjustments to the fund would be 
necessary to meet the requirements of the new system.  
 
 
4.7  Summary of Goals and Measures 
 
The proposals put forward by the Presidential Council aim to achieve the following final 
goals: 
 
•  To provide universal pension coverage to Chileans  
The pension system should be designed to provide pension benefits to all; and 
generate guarantees of continuity of income and protection against old age poverty 
for all persons. With this reform, social security would be transformed into an 
economic and social right of all Chileans; but the counterpart of this benefit - a 
deepening of commitments of the present and future beneficiaries with the pension 
system- is a responsibility that must be upheld. 
 
•  To increase the replacement rate of pensions to levels similar to developed 
countries   66
The replacement rate, measured as the ratio of available pension and the last 
remuneration, is an indicator of the capacity of the system to mitigate the decline in 
consumption spending that might result in the transition from active working life to 
retirement. The projections of the Council indicate that with the proposed reforms, the 
replacement rate of the pension system as a whole could be increased to over 70 
percent. 
 
•  To eliminate the risk of old age poverty 
Poverty in old age would be avoided by ensuring that the universal basic pension 
generates benefits that allow pensioners to maintain consumption higher than poverty 
levels. Although this measure would not eradicate poverty at the level of a household 
(due to the situation of the rest of its members), it would guarantee an elderly person 
the financial autonomy to satisfy his basic necessities. 
 
•  To reduce dispersion 
The projections of the present pension system indicate significant differences between 
affiliates with respect to several benefit variables such as contribution density, 
accumulated balances in capitalization accounts and gender differences in 
replacement rate. The proposed reforms are expected to significantly address and 
reduce these differences.  
 
•  To sustain the proposed benefits and maintain the goals of reform  
The attainment of these final goals may be judged by the ability of the proposed 
reforms to facilitate the attainment of six intermediate goals that tie specific reforms 
in different areas of operation of the system with their final results. These are listed 
below. 
 
1.  To structure a supporting first pillar that aspires to provide protection, fairness 
and cover. The proposals of the Council demand additional fiscal resources 
equivalent to 1% of the GDP in 2025, which is twice the fiscal commitment   67
that is projected to be needed to finance the minimum and welfare pensions in 
the present structure. 
 
2.  To increase the density of contributions- a condition that is essential to 
improve replacement rates and reduce the uneven dispersion of pension 
benefits. With the measures proposed to integrate nonwage-earning workers 
(independent, dismissed and inactive) into the system, the Council estimates 
that contribution density could be increased by around ten percentage points, 
from 51% to 61% in a period of five to ten years. This increase would be 
particularly beneficial for affiliates earning average income. 
 
3.  To intensify price competition in the pension services industry. Competition 
will create efficiency in fund management, prevent price-based exploitation of 
affiliates and provide choices to affiliates.  
 
 
4.  To improve financial risk management and increase the returns earned by 
workers on their contributions. The essence of the regime of individual 
capitalization is to use the contributions of workers to finance their future 
pensions; and the success of this mechanism depends entirely on the 
investment yields obtained on these contributions and on the levels of risk 
associated with these returns.  
 
 
5.  To strengthen the voluntary pillar. The voluntary savings pillar is particularly 
relevant for workers who use it to compensate for insufficient amounts of 
obligatory saving. 
 
6.  To improve transparency of the system. Since a mandatory system of pensions 
implicitly presumes that people do not have the foresight to save for their   68
retirement, it also has the obligation to operate a transparency and responsible 
system that reduces uncertainty about its capacity to provide old age support.  
 
The Council has attempted to articulate a harmonious set of reforms with the objective of 
generating a transformation from a regime of individual capitalization to an integrated 
pension system. The reforms, once implemented, are unlikely to have an immediate 
impact. Some of the proposed measures have to be implemented gradually; the benefits 
of some will be apparent only after many years; and there will be associated fiscal costs 
that will have to be provided for by the government. The most important task in setting 
up an orderly transition is to ensure that Chileans understand the sequence of measures 
and its impact on their future well-being. A pension system does not operate in the short 
term, but that does not have to be excuse not to initiate a reform process.    69
5. Lessons for Asian Countries  
 
The recommendations of the Marcel Commission and its implementation in Chile will be 
particularly relevant to governments in Asia, where countries are struggling to cope with 
ageing populations, albeit at different levels of criticality. At one end of the spectrum, 
developed countries in East Asia, such as Japan, Korea and Taiwan face such high rates 
of ageing that by 2025, their force is expected to start shrinking. At the other extreme are 
emerging economies such as India and China, with their large pools, and newly rising 
countries such as Vietnam which also have a substantial number of young people. Yet, 
although Asian countries are ageing at different rates, the challenge of caring for a 
growing number of elderly persons will have to be addressed by governments throughout 
the region.  
 
This phenomenon is simply the result of a transition from the second to the third 
demographic phase- a period when both birth and death rates are low and people enjoy 
relatively longer lives. Western countries, which industrialized and developed earlier, are 
already in this phase, and it is now the turn of Asia to follow the demographic cycle. 
With improved access to nutrition, sanitation and health care, longevity is rising steadily. 
At the same time, fertility rates have declined, often falling below the replacement level 
of 2.1 children per woman. The decline in birth rates is largely the outcome of economic 
growth and related urbanization, spread of education and easier and more informed 
access to birth control techniques.  This combination of increased life expectation and 
reduced birth rates has led to a rapidly ageing population, with serious consequences for 
labor supply.  
 
Table 26 shows that the old age dependency ratio- the ratio of Population in “dependent” 
age groups (over 65 years) to population in working age groups (15-64 years) - varies 
widely across a sample of Asian countries, depending on the extent of ageing. Japan, 
Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan are likely to age the fastest, and consequently 
be the most disadvantaged in terms of availability of domestic labor. By 2050, the 
absolute population size in the more developed economies- Japan, Korea and Taiwan- is   70
forecast to shrink relative to 2005. China and Thailand will follow suit: the working 
population in China is expected to peak in 2010 and fall steadily after. By 2050, the old 
age dependency ratio in China will be about 39 percent. Vietnam, Myanmar, Indonesia 
and Malaysia will age at a slower pace. The lowest dependent elderly projections for 
2050 are for India, and for countries such as Lao PDR, Phillipines, Cambodia and 
Bangladesh. For this group, the problems associated with ageing people will need to be 
addressed in the future.  
 
Traditionally, Asian family structures and a predominance of rural communities led to a 
system where children cared for their elderly parents and the extended family provided an 
informal source of retirement finance. Pension systems tended to focus on public sector 
employees, who enjoyed generous benefits in most countries. Occupational pensions, 
where available, were usually limited to employees of large corporations. As a result 
retirees relied on a combination of family support and own savings to provide for their 
old age. For instance, in 1990, the income of an average Korean over 60 was 
disaggregated as follows: 32% from working; 55% from children, 10% from other 
sources; and only 3% from public and private pensions
76. 
 
In addition to declining fertility rates and increasing longevity, Asia’s fast growing 
markets also exhibit a trend towards rapid urbanization
77. The proportion of the 
population that lives in urban areas has risen significantly over the last two decades for 
countries in developing Asia. For instance, in China, the proportion of population that 
resides in urban areas is forecast to increase from 27.4 percent in 1990 to almost 45 
percent by 2010; in India, the urban population will rise from 25.5 percent in 1990 to 
30.1 percent in 2010.  Overall, Asia continues to be fairly rural, as only 41 percent of its 
population was classified as urban in 2007. However, the rate of growth of urban 
population in Asia, projected at 2.19 percent over 2007-2025, is much higher than that of 
Europe (0.18 percent), North America (1.11 percent) and Latin America and 
Carribean(1.38 percent)
78.  
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Urbanization, notably in China and India, is largely the outcome of a shift in economic 
activity from agrarian to industrial and services sectors. Collectively, these socio-
economic changes have weakened the traditional role of the family as a provider of 
informal financial security to the elderly, and resulted in large numbers of urban poor 
and/or elderly with no formal access to income or pension.  
 
In response, governments of Asian countries have been forced to reconsider and reform 
their pension systems in order to extend coverage, provide new private plans, and 
improve the returns provided by existing plans. There is a strong trend towards adopting 
defined contribution schemes, especially of a mandatory nature. Table 27 indicates the 
movement to DC schemes in Asia, and their broad scope.  The adoption of DC schemes 
is driven by diverse factors- ranging from an imperative to control fiscal expenditure on 
publicly provided pensions to the extension of the coverage of occupational pensions. 
Thus, increasingly, Asian countries appear to be moving towards the multi-pillar pension 
system suggested by the World Bank
79.  It is in the above context that relevant lessons 
from Chile’s reform may be drawn. These however will have to be applicable to varying 
degrees in each Asian country, and even then, adaptations must be made for the local 
context and capacities. 
 
5.1  The Role of a DC system 
 
Proper planning of a DC system is a formidable task. Blake, Curtis and Dowd (2008) 
have suggested that a DC pension structure must be designed from back to front- that is, 
from the desired output to required inputs, in order to achieve the objective of delivering 
an adequate pension with a high degree of probability. They suggest that key factors in an 
optimally designed system include the following: 
•  The consumption profile desired by the plan member in retirement (the expected 
present value of this equals the size of the fund that will need to be accumulated 
by the time of retirement) 
•  The vehicle for delivering the pension, either a life annuity or drawdown 
•  The planned retirement date   72
•  Working backwards, the combination of contributions and investment strategy 
most likely to deliver the fund, taking into account the plan member’s attitude to 
risk and the value of his human capital (the discounted present value of lifetime 
labor income), which is needed to determine both the required value of the fund at 
retirement date and the required contribution amount during the accumulation 
phase. 
 
Chile’s experience shows that well managed DC systems work for some segment of the 
population; and is capable of providing adequate replacement rates. To illustrate, a full 
time worker with steady employment and contribution history, who contributed for, say, 
45 years, could expect to secure a replacement rate of 70 to 80 percent from his pension 
account, even assuming a modest 5 percent rate of return. It has been observed that 
contribution and coverage is highest among salaried employees who are mandated to 
contribute into the system: World Bank estimates show that while 64.7 percent of 
employed persons contributed in 2003, a considerably higher 78.6 percent of salaried 
persons were contributors. The most active contributors and beneficiaries of Chile’s 
system were public sector employees, workers in large corporations, highly educated 
workers, high-income workers, and those working in urban areas.  
 
The ability of the Chilean DC system to provide old age income security appears to be 
the least effective for those in irregular and seasonal employment, those without formal 
employment contracts that mandate contributions, and the lifetime poor. Thus there are 
“gaps”, due to which some sections of society are bypassed by the system. The Marcel 
Commission recommended a Solidarity Pension System (SPS) to address this systemic 
weakness. Asian countries will need to consider how to structure their own solidarity tier 
(sometimes referred to as social pensions), which is equivalent to the zero tier in the 
World Bank’s definition of the five-tier pension framework
80. Social solidarity features 
are evident in the earnings-based social security system of the first tier, but these do not 
fully address the needs of the lifetime poor. The mandatory savings pillar therefore will 
not be sufficient even in the best-run system for meeting the needs of retirees.  
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Thus a critical lesson from Chile is that an individual capitalization regime, although very 
democratic and effective in theory, has to be supplemented by some social risk pooling 
arrangements. Recent reforms in Europe also reflect the multi-pillar trend. In Germany, 
for instance, reforms have introduced a voluntary funded DC tier in addition to the 
existing PAYG system; and demand for the second pillar products has risen considerably 
in recent years
81. Specific reforms needed thus depend on the initial starting point. 
 
There is a need to design some social risk-pooling arrangements for the lifetime poor, and 
to provide alternative retirement funds for those who opt out or do not have access to 
contributory pension schemes. In Chile, unlike many other countries, most self-employed 
workers are not part of the informal economy; in the sense that they are tax payers and 
subject to regulation. However, Asian countries such as India, Indonesia and China, 
which have substantial levels of informal sector employment, must address the additional 
challenge of poverty prevention in their large unskilled and semi-skilled, highly mobile  
force that works outside the formal system. Risk-pooling arrangements must be designed 
keeping in view the earnings capacity of informal sector workers- which tends to show 
large variations. Since professional, well-paid self employed persons are more likely to 
make voluntary contributions into a pension fund, extending an existing DC scheme to 
this category of workers is likely to be more effective. However, the poorest unskilled 
workers are more likely to benefit from social pensions and social assistance schemes, 
which form the zero pillar in the World Bank’s five pillar framework. (Do we have a 
graph or a table of this? If not, put it at an appropriate place).  
 
Many Asian countries (for instance China, Thailand and the Philippines) have 
experienced difficulties in implementing individual retirement accounts, whether 
mandatory or on voluntary basis. Developing robust annuities markets, particularly 




Wide-ranging, sweeping pension reforms have always been politically sensitive to initiate, 
and tend to generate discussion and dissent among potential contributors to the system.   74
Such reactions are more likely in Asian economies, where much of the electorate is often 
poor, financially illiterate and only marginally, if at all, supported by state social security 
programs. In this context, a program of rational pension reform, with mechanisms that 
adapt pension systems automatically to a changed economic and demographic 
environment, rather than postpone such modifications to occasional high-profile pension 
reforms, might be more appropriate for Asia
83. Such a program would also permit greater 
flexibility in managing uncertain longevity trends.  But it requires robust data bases, 
technical expertise, and indigenous research capabilities which may not be currently 
available in many non-high income Asian countries. 
 
Gender issues are an integral part of a social security system. Asia’s traditional value 
systems often require women to exit from the workforce in order to care for their families. 
Since women tend to live longer than men, and work and contribute towards their 
pensions for lesser number of years, they are doubly penalized by mandatory DC systems. 
Features such as mandatory joint pensions for married men, allowing third-party 
contributions into a woman’s pension account and using unisex mortality tables are some 
reforms accepted by Chile that may be adapted by developing Asia to suit its labor force 
conditions.  
 
5.2  Need for a System-Wide Perspective  
 
Reform of the pension system cannot be carried out in isolation if it is to be effective. It 
has to be accompanied by policy reform in capital markets, as well as institutional and 
legal changes in fiscal and other spheres. An over-emphasis on needs, without making 
requisite efforts to improve organizational and systemic capabilities, and without 
increasing economic and fiscal capacities, will lead to dysfunctionalities while not 
meeting the needs of the elderly population.  Roles of the state and the private sector 
must be clearly defined. Ideally, privately managed DC funds should be accompanied by 
a state-funded and managed social safety net. Regulation and supervision should be 
carried out by an autonomous and professional authority, with sufficient feedback 
channels to incorporate views of participating members and institutions.    75
 
In many Asian countries, a systemic approach is not given sufficient importance; instead 
any given component is introduced either because of a fiscal or spending crisis
84, or as a 
consequence of macro-economic and demographic changes
85; and subsequently functions 
in isolation. A more integrated pension model that incorporates as many components of 
the five pillar pension framework as is possible within individual countries is best suited 
to delivering retirement income more effectively and efficiently. Policy planners must 
focus on setting up such a framework. 
 
5.3 Costs  and  Risks 
 
Even in a country like Chile with an established pension system and well-developed 
financial and capital markets, there is a constant need to fine-tune the design and 
regulatory features which lead to affordable administrative and asset-management costs. 
In Asia, the administration and asset management cost are already high and more efforts 
are needed in this direction. 
 
As more Asian economies establish DC systems, investors will be exposed to financial 
market risk to a greater extent. This is particularly true of systems where contributors will 
have the flexibility of choosing among multiple funds with varying risk-return 
characteristics. Even in established markets such as Chile, awareness of costs, returns and 
benefits of pension schemes has been found to be very poor. Thus emerging economies in 
Asia will need to invest in financial education and pension awareness courses so that 
investors can make informed choices. Chile’s plan for setting up a fund for investor 
education, financed jointly by fund managers and the government, may be considered for 
adoption (with suitable modifications) by Asian countries. However, since much of 
developing Asia continues to reside in rural areas, it may be necessary to involve non-
government organizations and local government officers in disseminating information at 
a grassroots level, and to benefit from the local knowledge.  
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In addition, adequate institutional safeguards need to be in place to ensure sound pension 
fund governance. Investment regulation should be risk-based, with the aim of 
establishing prudential limits to protect retirement funds. Over regulation of investment, 
and excessive investment in sovereign and public debt, will generate sub-optimal returns 
and hence increase pension costs.  
 
5.4   Policy Oriented Pension Research 
 
Chile has encouraged a culture of solid analytical, policy-oriented indigenous research on 
pension issues, and has made available robust databases to undertake such research. In 
Latin America, Chile is perceived as a leader in pension policy in Latin America. Chile’s 
influence preceded that of the World Bank in the region, and was in fact instrumental in 
influencing the views of the Bank
86. The positive impact of the Chilean reform on 
savings, capital accumulation and overall evolution of the financial industry was 
perceived as a positive for the system. Consequently, many countries in Latin America 
modeled their pension systems on Chile; and in the process Latin American countries 
were able to build sound local capacity in pension policy analysis.  
 
Such a tradition of pension research is lacking in many Asian countries. Accurate 
actuarial databases are necessary to allow pension fund companies to price longevity-risk 
products correctly.  Existing databases on morbidity and mortality patterns need to be 
strengthened. Information on the behavior of individuals and firms concerning saving and 
retirement should be monitored and updated. Information on socio-economic 
characteristics of workers in the informal sector should be obtained through regular 
surveys, so that appropriate policies can be framed to integrate them into a pension 
system. The analytical rigor and robustness of data on social security in Chile matches 
that of the OECD countries. Non-OECD Asia would do well to lift its own data base and 
analytical research to the standards set by Chile and OECD countries. 
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Asian countries need to substantially enhance their capacity to undertake rigorous 
empirical-evidence based policy-relevant research on pensions and health-care issues. 
The challenges of ageing in Asia are too immense and complex to delay building such 




Asian countries should consider setting up independent pension research centres; and 
establish an Asian forum for the National Centres to exchange information experiences 
and engage in policy dialogue. An Asian forum for social security deserves serious 
consideration. But the focus should be on learning from others and on building local 
capabilities and capacities to improve social security administration, coverage, and 
benefits, without sacrificing robustness and long term sustainability. 
 
As Asia will get old before it gets rich, it has a vital stake in constructing sustainable, 
robust and adequate pension systems and social safety nets. There is an urgency for the 
Asian countries to develop a new social contract involving all the stakeholders, current 
and future beneficiaries, key policymakers, and employer representatives, and the 
taxpayers. A consensus on social contract will make the task of such construction more 
harmonious, and thereby help countries better manage the globalization challenges. The 
extent to which Asia succeeds in this task will have a major impact on its role in the 
twenty first century.  Table 1        A Snapshot of the Chilean Economy
2005 2006 2007
(estimates)
Gross Domestic Product (USD billions) 119 146 162.5
Real GDP growth (%) 5.7 4 5.2
Consumer Prices (Annual % change Dec on Dec) 3.7 2.6 7.8
Population (millions) 16.3 16.4 16.6
Export of goods fob (USD billion) 41.3 58.1 68.3
Import of goods cif (USD billion) 30.5 35.9 43.8
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) 1.1 3.6 3.8
Foreign Exchange Reserves excluding gold (USD million) 16960.1 19424.6 16904.7
Foreign Debt (% of GDP) 37.7 32.6 32.3
Average Exchange Rate (Chilean Pesos per Dollar) 559.9 530.3 522.7
Source: The Chilean Economy at a Glance, Central Bank of Chile, January 2008.
Downloaded from www.bcentral.cl on May 18, 2008                     Table 2    Demographic Indicators
Total Population (in millions) 16.4
Urban population (in percent of total)  87.6
Area (thousand sq. km.)  756.1
Density (per sq. km)  21.7
Life expectancy at birth (years)  78.2
Crude birth rate (per thousand) 15.7
Crude death rate (per thousand)  5.4
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 births)  8
Mortality rate (ages 1-4, per 1000)  10
















































GDP US$ million US$ million
1980 11.1 35.1 18,669 7.9 1,075 27.6 2492.9 -1.8 -6.4 4705 5797
1981 11.3 19.7 19,829 6.2 1,273 32.6 2884.8 -4.7 -14.5 3837 7181
1982 11.5 9.9 17,134 -13.6 1,239 24.3 2118.4 -2.3 -9.5 3706 3989
1983 11.7 27.3 16,654 -2.8 1,558 19.8 1694.3 -1.1 -5.7 3831 3085
1984 11.9 19.9 17,634 5.9 1,893 19.2 1621.8 -2.1 -11 3651 3574
1985 12.0 30.7 17,982 2 2,652 16.5 1368.5 -1.4 -8.6 3804 3072
1986 12.2 19.5 18,988 5.6 3,419 17.7 1447.2 -1.2 -6.7 4191 3436
1987 12.5 19.9 20,237 6.6 4,586 20.9 1678.6 -0.7 -3.5 5224 4396
1988 12.7 14.7 21,712 7.3 6,037 24.6 1945.7 -0.2 -0.9 7052 5292
1989 12.9 17.0 24,015 10.6 7,577 28.4 2203.8 -0.7 -2.4 8078 7233
1990 13.1 26 24,896 3.7 9,622 31.6 2409.1 -0.5 -1.5 8373 7742
1991 13.3 21.8 26,880 8 12,720 36.4 2734.6 -0.1 -0.3 8942 8207
1992 13.5 15.4 30,180 12.3 16,123 44.5 3283.0 -1.0 -2.2 10007 10183
1993 13.8 12.7 32,293 7 19,276 47.7 3463.4 -2.6 -5.4 9199 11134
1994 14.0 11.4 34,138 5.7 23,175 55.2 3941.2 -1.6 -2.9 11604 11820
1995 14.2 8.2 37,767 10.6 28,309 71.3 5020.9 -1.3 -1.9 16024 15900
1996 14.4 7.4 40,562 7.4 31,238 75.8 5255.0 -3.1 -4.1 16627 19199
1997 14.6 6.1 43,284 6.7 34,721 82.8 5663.0 -3.7 -4.4 17870 20822
1998 14.8 5.1 44,700 3.3 36,532 79.4 5354.8 -3.9 -4.9 16323 19882
1999 15.0 3.3 44,534 -0.4 37,135 73.0 4860.2 0.1 0.1 17162 15987
2000 15.2 3.8 46,521 4.5 40,570 75.2 4943.7 -0.9 -1.2 19210 18507
2001 15.4 3.6 48,162 3.5 43,529 68.6 4451.1 -1.1 -1.6 18272 17429
2002 15.6 2.5 49,202 2.2 46,332 67.3 4314.0 -0.6 -0.9 18180 17092
2003 15.7 2.8 51,156 4 51,156 74.0 4698.2 -0.8 -1.1 21664 19322
2004 16.0 1.1 54,217 6 58,405 95.8 5992.0 2.1 2.2 32520 24794
2005 16.2 3.1 57,316 5.7 66,599 119.0 7350.8 1.3 1.1 41297 30492
2006 16.4 3.4 59,589 4 77,338 145.8 8903.4 5.3 3.6 58116 35903
2007 16.6 3.9 63,079 5.9 85,274 160.8 9697.7 5.9 3.7 58700 43840
2008 16.8 4.1 66,233 5 90,024 166.9 9948.5 3.9 2.3 53600 42600
Notes: IMF data after 2006 are estimates
Source: IMF Database and United Nations Statistics Division; Data extracted on April 25, 2008 from 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/cdb_source_xrxx.asp?source_code=26 2008 projections from IMF Country Report No. 07/333, September 2007Table 4    Selected Fiscal Indicators 
% of GDP 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Gross Consolidated Debt of the Public Sector (central bank, non-
financial public enterprises, and general government) 44.4 39.0 30.4 26.0 25.3 25.1
Of Which: Central Government Debt 13.0 10.7 7.2 5.9 5.2 4.5
Central Government Fiscal Balance -0.2 2.1 4.6 7.7 6.0 2.9
Gross External Debt 58.2 45.4 37.8 33.1 31.0 30.1
Public 12.5 10.3 8.0 7.4 6.5 5.0
Private 45.7 35.1 29.8 25.7 24.5 24.3
Source: IMF Country Report No. 07/333, September 2007. Data for 2007 and 2008 are estimates
Note: Gross consolidated debt of the public sector does not include liabilities on account of recognition bonds that totalled 9.5 percent of GDP at end-2006 
Table 5  Pension Funds in the AFP System 
 
Pension Funds  Total (US$ million)  Proportion of 
Market 




ING SANTA MARIA  9930.05 11.20%
PLANVITAL 3065.96 3.46%
TOTAL 88631.78 100%
Source: Association of AFP Annual Report 2006 




Table 6  Pension Funds by Fund Type 
Pension Funds  Fund A  Fund B  Fund C  Fund D Fund E  Total 
  (US$ Million) 
BANSANDER 2688.15 2640.41 4474.55 900.01 131.06  10,834.18
CUPRUM 4087.72 3818.20 6692.35 1593.75 279.59  16,471.61
HABITAT 3611.97 5191.01 9589.28 2074.20 384.36  20,850.82
PLANVITAL 429.19 553.50 1547.38 488.99 46.50  3,065.96
BBVA PROVIDA  4494.44  6101.43 13,241.09 3216.11 426.09  27,479.16
ING SANTA MARIA  1546.89  2070.52 4795.57 1373.62 143.45  9,930.05
TOTAL 16,858.36 20,375.47 40,340.22 9,646.68 1,411.05 88,631.78
Source: Association of AFP Annual Report 2006 
Note: Data pertains to December 2006 
 
Table 7  Types of Pensions  
 
Type of Pension  Percentage of total pensions paid, 
November 2007  
Early Retirement  37.0 
Old Age  28.0 
Widow’s Pension  17.0 
Orphan’s Pension  8.0 
Total Disability  7.0 
Partial Disability  1.0 
Others 2.0 
Total 100 
Source: Asociacion AFP, downloaded on February 10, 2008 from  
http://www.afp-ag.cl/ingles/sistema/02_04f.htm 
  
Table 8  An Overview of the AFP System 
 








Value of Pension 
Funds# 
(US$ Billion) 
1981 1.4  -  12.9  0.33 
1982 1.4  1.1  28.5  1.05 
1983 1.6  1.2  21.2  1.91 
1984  1.9  1.4 3.6 2.52 
1985 2.3  1.6  13.4  3.48 
1986 2.6  1.8  12.3  4.55 
1987  2.9  2.0 5.4 5.57 
1988  3.2  2.2 6.5 6.82 
1989  3.5  2.3 6.9 8.41 
1990 3.7  2.3  15.6  11.14 
1991 4.1  2.5  29.7  15.76 
1992  4.4  2.7 3.0 17.56 
1993 4.7  2.8  16.2  22.56 
1994 5.0  2.9  18.2  27.23 
1995 5.3  3.0  -2.5  28.95 
1996  5.6  3.1 3.5 30.67 
1997  5.8  3.3 4.7 33.53 
1998 6.0  3.1  -1.1  34.77 
1999 6.1  3.3  16.3  42.24 
2000  6.3  3.2 4.4 45.49 
2001  6.4  3.4 6.7 49.99 
2002  6.7  3.4 3.0 53.44 
2003 6.9  3.6  11.9  61.13 
2004  7.1  3.6 9.1 68.55 
2005  7.5  3.7 5.7 74.76 
2006 7.7  4.0  17.0  88.63 
2007  7.9*  4.3* 6.5* 111.04 
*as at November 2007 
# as at December of each year 
Source:  
(i) Members, Contributors, Annual Yield from  Asociacion AFP, downloaded on 
February 10, 2008 from http://www.afp-ag.cl/ingles/02_04.asp 
(ii) Value of pension funds from Sistema Chileno de Pensiones, Sexta Edición, Anexo 




Table 9   Pension Fund Investment Portfolio  
 
Sector   US$ million, in 
June 2007 
% of Total 
Electricity 7144  7.1 
Telecommunications 1751  1.7 
Sanitation 985  1.0 
Natural Resources  5624  5.6 
Real Estate  4432  4.4 
Infrastructure 2355  2.3 
Services 4542  4.5 
Investment Funds  4562  4.5 
Banks 24,273  24.1 
Foreign 32,816  32.6 
Government   9704  9.6 
Various Industries  2409  2.4 
Total 100,598  100 
      Source: Table N.3, AFP Association Research Series No.62, August 2007 
  
 
Table 10  Deficit of the Pension System in Chile: 1981-2004 
 












1981 3.6  0.0  0.2  0.0  3.8  n.a  3.8 
1982 6.0  0.1  0.3  0.0  6.4  n.a  6.4 
1983 6.5  0.2  0.4  0.0  7.1  n.a  7.1 
1984 6.9  0.2  0.5  0.0  7.6  n.a  7.6 
1985 6.0  0.2  0.5  0.0  6.7  n.a  6.7 
1986 5.9  0.3  0.5  0.0  6.7  n.a  6.7 
1987 5.2  0.4  0.5  0.0  6.1  n.a  6.1 
1988 4.6  0.4  0.4  0.0  5.4  n.a  5.4 
1989 4.7  0.4  0.3  0.0  5.4  n.a  5.4 
1990 3.3  0.5  0.3  0.0  4.1  1.2  5.4 
1991 3.3  0.5  0.3  0.0  4.1  1.2  5.3 
1992 3.2  0.5  0.3  0.0  4.0  1.1  5.1 
1993 3.2  0.6  0.3  0.0  4.1  1.2  5.3 
1994 3.1  0.7  0.3  0.0  4.1  1.1  5.2 
1995 2.8  0.7  0.3  0.0  3.8  1.1  4.9 
1996 3.1  0.7  0.3  0.0  4.1  1.1  5.2 
1997 3.0  0.8  0.3  0.0  4.1  1.1  5.2 
1998 3.2  0.9  0.3  0.0  4.4  1.1  5.5 
1999 3.2  1.1  0.4  0.0  4.7  1.2  5.9 
2000 3.1  1.1  0.4  0.0  4.7  1.3  6.0 
2001 3.1  1.1  0.4  0.1  4.7  1.3  6.0 
2002 3.0  1.1  0.4  0.1  4.6  1.3  5.9 
2003 2.9  1.2  0.4  0.1  4.5  1.3  5.8 
2004 2.5  1.3  0.3  0.1  4.2  1.3  5.5 
Average from 1981 to 2004 
  3.3 0.6 0.4  0.02  4.3  1.4  5.7 
Projected average from 2005-10 
 2.0  1.2  0.4  0.08 3.7  1.3  5.0 
Source: Arenas De Mesa and Mesa Lago (2006), Table 2, P.5.  
Note: For the years 1981-89, Operational Deficit includes military deficit 
  n.a: Not available  
  
Table 11  Commissions Charged by AFPs  
 
Year  Fixed Monthly Commission 
per Contribution (in pesos) 
(Weighted Mean) 
Variable Commision  
(as % of Taxable Wage) 
1982 29  2.66 
1983 182  3.62 
1984 145  3.58 
1985 138  3.57 
1986 131  3.40 
1987 134  3.38 
1988 885  3.54 
1989 610  3.24 
1990 460  2.93 
1991 382  2.93 
1992 325  2.93 
1993 220  2.98 
1994 180  2.99 
1995 168  3.00 
1996 205  2.91 
1997 185  2.90 
1998 406  2.61 
1999 476  2.40 
2000 596  2.31 
2001   591  2.26 
2002 575  2.26 
2003 570  2.26 
2004 548  2.26 
2005 410  2.30 
Source: Source: Sistema Chileno de Pensiones, Sexta Edición, Anexo Estadístico, SAFP, 
2007,  Retrieved on November 12, 2007 from   
http://www.safp.cl/sischilpen/sexta_edicion_2007/sischilpen2007_anexo.pdf 
 
Note: Commissions charged for each year pertain to December of that year   
 
 
Table 12  Equity Limits in Multi-Funds 
                       Maximum Limits For Equities 
Fund A  80%  40% 
Fund B  60%  25% 
Fund C  40%  15% 
Fund D  20%  5% 
Fund E  Not Authorized  Not Authorized 
Source: Associacion AFP, downloaded on October 10, 2007 from http://www.afp-
ag.cl/ingles/03_01.asp  
  




Jan. 07- Sept. 07 
(9 months) 
Sept. 02 - Sept. 07 
(Annualised) 
Fund A  12.62  17.18 
Fund B  9.72  12.33 
Fund C  6.89  9.15 
Fund D  4.24  6.64 
Fund E  1.31  3.44 
Note: Yields are deflated by change in UF during the period 
Source: Associacion AFP, Multifunds: Results and Trends, No.18, September 2007, P.1, 
Downloaded on November 12, 2007 from http://www.afp-ag.cl/ingles/estudios/multifondos18.pdf 
 
Table 14    Pension Fund Investment by Sector  
 








  Investment in each sector, expressed as a % of total investment, and  measured in 
December of each year 
1981  28.07 71.34 0.59   0.00 
1982  26.00 73.38 0.61   0.01 
1983  44.46 53.36 2.17   0.02 
1984  42.06 55.65 1.81   0.48 
1985  42.44 55.97 1.11   0.48 
1986  46.64 48.66 4.59   0.12 
1987  41.36 49.44 8.82   0.38 
1988  35.41 50.06 14.49    0.04 
1989  41.58 39.21 19.19    0.03 
1990  44.07 33.38 22.43    0.12 
1991 38.3  26.65  34.94    0.10 
1992  40.89 25.21 33.76    0.14 
1993 39.3  20.68  39.36  0.57  0.09 
1994  39.69 20.08 39.31  0.90 0.02 
1995  39.41 23.11 37.18  0.20 0.09 
1996 42.1  24.56  32.77  0.54  0.02 
1997  39.59 30.13 28.96  1.25 0.08 
1998  40.96 32.05 21.17  5.73 0.09 
1999  34.59 33.70 18.26  13.42  0.03 
2000  35.73 35.62 17.57  10.88  0.19 
2001    35.02 33.08 18.49  13.35  0.06 
2002  29.99 35.04 18.44  16.41  0.12 
2003  24.70 27.29 24.01  23.89  0.11 
2004  18.67 29.54 24.41  27.24  0.14 
2005  16.45 29.74 23.25  30.41  0.16 
Source: Sistema Chileno de Pensiones, Sexta Edición, Anexo Estadístico, SAFP, 2007, 
Retrieved on October 10, 2007, from   
http://www.safp.cl/sischilpen/sexta_edicion_2007/sischilpen2007_anexo.pdf  
Si 
Table 15   Pension System Coverage of Economically Active Population 
 
  SAFP Measure                               World Bank Measure 
Year (1) 
Members Covered/ 











1989  56.81     
1990 58.91  62.21  67.46  80.71 
1991  61.82     
1992 63.84  61.14  64.35  79.1 
1993  63.82     
1994 65.11  62.26  66.2  80.42 
1995  66.99     
1996 68.07  62.43  65.8  79.62 
1997  68.71     
1998 68.31  58.9  64.77  78.58 
1999  66.58     
2000 68.48  58.06  64.34  78.09 
2001    69.00     
2002  72.59     
2003 70.72  58.74  64.71  78.65 
2004  62.69     
2005  67.75     
Sources: 
 (1) from Sistema Chileno de Pensiones, Sexta Edición, Anexo Estadístico, SAFP, 2007, 
Retrieved on October 10, 2007, from   
http://www.safp.cl/sischilpen/sexta_edicion_2007/sischilpen2007_anexo.pdf. 
Note: Members covered in (1) refers to members of the AFP System with fewer than 
twelve months without movement in their individual capitalization accounts. 
(2), (3), (4) 
From Rofman, R. and L. Lucchetti (2006), Table A4.1, P.60 
Note: Economically active population includes individuals over the age of 20 who are 
employed or are actively seeking employment. Employed persons are defined as those 
over the age of 20 who are engaged in some form of work, whether paid or unpaid during 
the reference week of the survey, or who may not have worked (due to vacations, medical 
leave, etc.) but do have employment to which they are expected to return. Those who 
describe themselves as underemployed are also included in this category. The definition 
of wage earners includes workers and employees of the public and private sectors, as well 
as household employees.  




              Beneficiaries / Population Age 65+ 
 
  All Men  Women 
1990 73.04  80.11  67.49 
1992 66.5  74.42  61.53 
1994 68.21  78.43  60.38 
1996 65.94  74.7  59.51 
1998 62.17  69.08  57.01 
2000 68.89  75.54  63.82 
2003 62.99  71.76  56.42 
Source:Rofman, R. and L. Lucchetti (2006), Table A4.1, P.60; and Table A4.4, P.61 
 
 
Table 17  Average Time by Occupational Status for Men and Women 
 
Occupational Status  Men  Women 
Formal Employee  60 percent 46 percent
Informal Employee  8 percent 8 percent
Self-employed  9 percent 7 percent
Unemployed percent  5  percent
Non-remunerative Family Work/Inactive 0 percent 35 percent
Source: Reproduced from Princeton(2007)  
Table 18  Employment Characteristics by Income Deciles  
 
  Deciles       
Percent (%)  I  II  IX  X 
Salaried but “No Contract”       
2003  50.7  34.0 12.2 10.0 
2006  45.0  29.4 13.1 11.0 
       
Employed but  “No Contribution”       
2003  60.0  45.1 30.4 28.3 
2006  54.6  39.7 26.2 25.8 
Note: Deciles are by Income of Household 




Table 19  Mismatch between Actual and Assumed Conditions 
  Assumed   Actual  
Coverage  Above 65%  55% 
Years of Working Life  45 40 
Density of Contributions  85% 52% 
Fund Returns  5%  4.5% to 6.5% 
Replacement Rate  70% to 80%  44% 
Source: Marcel (2006) 
 
 
Table 20 Incidence of Poverty and Indigence by Age (1990-2006) 
 
 
Year  Above 60 years Total Population 
  As % of Respective Population 
1990  20.6 38.6 
1992  16.2 32.9 
1994  14.6 27.6 
1996  11.0 23.2 
1998  11.0 21.7 
2000  7.9 20.2 
2003  9.8 18.7 
2006  7.5 13.7 
Source: CASEN 2006, La Situacion De Pobreza En Chile, 2006, www.mideplan.cl  

















On Member Income 
(%) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) = (1) – (2) (2) divided by (1) (3) divided by (1) 
1982 114788  126524  -11735 110.22 -10.22  2.66
1983 125059  110405  14653 88.28 11.72  3.62
1984 133585  118356  15229 88.60 11.40  3.58
1985 140729  117913  22816 83.79 16.21  3.57
1986 147004  116472  30531 79.23 20.77  3.4
1987 160685  123539  37145 76.88 23.12  3.38
1988 348764  311820  36944 89.41 10.59  3.54
1989 407490  331177  76313 81.27 18.73  3.24
1990 438736  346702  92035 79.02 20.98  2.93
1991 428291  322398  105893 75.28 24.72  2.93
1992 482828  381799  101029 79.08 20.92  2.93
1993 553588  437697  115891 79.07 20.93  2.98
1994 600134  492329  107806 82.04 17.96  2.99
1995 625602  512404  113198 81.91 18.09  3
1996 632059  530870  101189 83.99 16.01  2.91
1997 699537  592429  107108 84.69 15.31  2.9
1998 653758  539181  114577 82.47 17.53  2.61
1999 719925  511347  208578 71.03 28.97  2.4
2000 790225  468362  321863 59.27 40.73  2.31
2001 704622  457474  247147 64.92 35.08  2.26
2002 667968  457701  210267 68.52 31.48  2.26
2003 720988  530523  190465 73.58 26.42  2.26
2004 763800  539601  224200 70.65 29.35  2.26
2005 821448  586633  234814 71.41 28.59  2.3
Source: from Sistema Chileno de Pensiones, Sexta Edición, Anexo Estadístico, SAFP, 
2007, Retrieved on December 1, 2007   
http://www.safp.cl/sischilpen/sexta_edicion_2007/sischilpen2007_anexo.pdf 
Note: Columns (1), (2) and (3) are reported in thousands of dollars as of 
December 2005 
Table 22  Five Types of Limits Per Fund  
 
Per Instrument  19 
Groups of Instruments  9 
Per Issuer  46 
Groups of Issuers  4 
Related Interests  19 
Total   97 limits 
Source: Berstein (2006) 
 
Table 23   Solidarity Pension System Transition 
Year PBU    PMAS   
 CLP  USD  CLP  USD 
1
st July 2008  60,000  111  60,000  111 
1
st July 2009  75,000  139  75,000  139 
1
st July 2010  75,000  139  100,000  185 
1
st July 2011  75,000  139  150,000  278 
1
st July 2012  75,000  139  200,000  371 
 
Source: Gobierno de Chile. Reforma Previsional: Protección para la vejez en el Nuevo milenio, December 2006. 




Table 24  Annual Financial Flows With/Without Reform 
 
As Percent of GDP  2005             2025 (Projections) 
    Without Reform  With Reform 
INP + PMG + PASIS + BR  2.9  1.6  ---- 
Solidarity Pillar  ----  ----  2.5 
Contributory Pillar  1.1  2.5  2.9 




Table 25   Fiscal Cost of Proposed Reform 
 
  Proposal  Incremental Cost in 2025       
(% of GDP) 
1  New Solidarity Pillar  0.75 
2  Extension of Family Support Benefits to 
Independent Workers 
0.02 
3  Equal Tax Treatment for Contributions of 
Independent Workers  
0.05 
4  State Subsidy for New Entrants to Workforce   0.08 
5  Bonus accrued on each live birth  0.09 
6  Elimination of legal and tax restrictions that 
prevent sub-contracting of AFP Services  
0.01 
7  Recognition of credit of first category investments 
of the pension funds 
0.01 
8  Extension of APV and APVC  0.07 
9  Creation of a fund for pension education  0.01 
10  Automatic induction into the pension system; 
including initial contribution by the State 
0.01 
  Total 1.1 
  
Table 26 Old Age Dependency Ratios in Selected Asian Countries  
 
Country  Old Age Dependency Ratio  
  2005 2050 
China 11  39 
Hong Kong  16  58 
India 8  21 
Japan 30  74 
Singapore 12  59 
South Korea  13  64 
Taiwan 13  63 
Thailand 11  38 
Note: Old Age Dependency Ratio: Ratio of over 65-yr olds to 15-64 yr old persons 
Source: Allianz Dresdner Economic Research, UN 
 
 
Table 27 Defined Contribution Schemes in Asia-Pacific 
Country  Year of Introduction  
of DC Scheme  
Type 
China 2004  Voluntary  Occupational 
Hong Kong  2000  Mandatory Occupational 
India  2004  Mandatory for new Civil Servants/ 
Voluntary for all Citizens 
Japan 2001  Voluntary  Occupational 
Singapore 1955  Mandatory  Occupational 
South Korea  2005  Voluntary Occupational 
Taiwan   2005  Mandatory Occupational 
Thailand 1997 
Planned for 2008 
Mandatory for new Civil Servants 
Mandatory Occupational 
Source: Allianz Global Investors (2007)  
Figure 1   Multi-Pillar Pension Taxonomy of the World Bank 
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Note: The size of x or X characterizes the importance of each pillar for each target group. 
 
Source: Holzmann, Robert and Richard Hinz, 2005, “Old-Age Income Support in the 
twenty first Century: An International Perspective on Pension Systems and Reform”, 
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